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ABSTRACT
This thesis historically examines CIO union organizers
in the Ely, Nevada copper district from 1941 to 1943, when
three International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers
(Mine-Mill) affiliates won National Labor Relations Board
certification elections.

Through their educational function

of mobilizing working-class support for the union and of
filtering the international union's progressive program to
its locals, the Mine-Mill organizers fulfilled Antonio
Gramsci's concept of the "organic intellectual."

Although

conditions favorable for unionization were apparent by the
mid-1930s, Mine-Mill was initially frustrated as the union's
left-wing and moderate leaders clashed over tactics,
allowing several AFL craft unions to gain a foothold in the
district.

Mine-Mill's ultimate victory in 1943 ended the

informal mediation of industrial relations that had
developed after 1919 when employers instituted antiunion
strategies such as welfare capitalism and the open shop.
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PREFACE
Between 1941 and 1943 the International Union of Mine,
Mill and Smelter Workers (Mine-Mill) dispatched several
organizers to the Ely, Nevada copper district to revive the
union's floundering locals.

Their primary task was to

recruit enough workers away from American Federation of
Labor (AFL) locals to attain either outright recognition
from the district's two primary employers, Nevada
Consolidated, a Kennecott Copper subsidiary, and the
Consolidated Coppermines Corporation, or to win
certification through a National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) election.

Although their campaign initially met

frustration, by October 1943 Mine-Mill-affiliated locals
were the bargaining agents for most of the area's copper
workers.
American labor historians have not fully explored the
establishment of industrial unions by copperworkers in the
Intermountain West during the early 1940s.

Although there

are several studies of Mexican-American workers in New
Mexico and Arizona, the region's other states have been
largely ignored.

Nevada historian Russell Elliott, an Ely-

area native, has written extensively on the district's
unions prior to 1920, but has only briefly and inaccurately
viii

covered the Depression and World War II years.

Elliott's

sentimental accounts of the district's employers and his
anti-CIO bias obscure a complex process that led to the
establishment of legally-sanctioned and employer-recognized
locals.1
Better models are offered by Mario Garcia's work on El
Paso smelterworkers and Jack Cargill's study of a New
Mexican zinc mining community during their famous 1950-52
Salt of the Earth strike.

Both of these historians employ a

wide array of sources to critically examine their respective
subjects.

Following Garcia's and Cargill's lead, I use

union archives, primarily the correspondence of union
organizers, federal and state government records, oral
interviews, and secondary sources to analyze the
construction of the Cold War capital-labor accord as a
historically contingent process conditioned by the attitudes
and expectations of the participants.

This approach allows

a clearer view into the complex consciousness of workers
immediately before and during World War II.2
Examining mid-twentieth century labor relations and
social conditions at both the national and local level tests
several pertinent questions: What effect did the defense-era
and World War II prosperity have on the copper industry and
its company towns?

What accounted for the success or

failure of unionism during this period?

What was the role

of the wartime state apparatus— specifically the NLRB— in

determining the formation of unions?

How are the

contrasting assumptions of both the organizers and the
workers modified as industrial unionism comes to a company
town?

Finally, what specific problems did CIO union

organizers face in western company towns and copper camps?
This study is presented as a social history of the
union organizer.

Hired from the membership or through a

network that funneled working-class activists to union
officers, the organizer served as a conduit, filtering the
international union's organizational program to the locals.
At the community level, organizers confronted the sometimes
conflicting desires of workers whose consciousness was
shaped by immediate concerns of job and family security.

I

examine the organizer's role by adapting Antonio Gramsci's
notion of the "organic intellectual.11 When convincing
workers to join a union, organizers gave shape to the power
inherent in mass organization.

This was accomplished by

either prying workers' loyalty away from the company or by
providing a vehicle for worker resistance.

The union

organizer thus serves as a historical agent with the
political function of consolidating working-class interests
into an institutional form.
In the Ely district, paternalism and unionism co
existed in an informal system of mediating worker grievances
while protecting company profits and control over
production.

Kennecott's Nevada Consolidated, the state's
x

largest industrial enterprise, stifled unionism through its
strategy of welfare capitalism at its company towns of
McGill and Ruth.

Consolidated Coppermines, operating an

underground mine at Kimberly, maintained an open shop
through intimidation and by paying relatively high wages to
its more transient miners.

Despite these tactics, a

minority of workers, particularly those in the skilled
crafts, maintained both AFL- and CIO-affiliated locals,
without negotiating collective bargaining agreements until
the early 1940s.

During this period, Mine-Mill locals

throughout the West mirrored the international union, which
experienced its greatest membership gains.
As the dominant union in nonferrous metal mining, MineMill benefitted from growing working-class militancy
beginning in the mid-1930s.

As recently as 1933, Mine-Mill

languished as the dormant remnant of the militant Western
Federation of Miners (WFM).

Revitalized by New Deal pro

labor legislation and affiliation with the CIO, Mine-Mill
challenged both AFL craft unions and open-shop employers
nationwide.

Not only did the union begin to organize the

numerous copper, zinc, and lead mines in the West and
Midwest, but by the end of World War II it had extended its
reach as far south as Alabama's iron-ore fields and as far
east as Connecticut's brass refineries.

Mine-Mill's leaders

combined an aggressive organizing strategy with a left-wing
democratic philosophy that attracted black and ethnic

workers, as well as many other industrial workers long
ignored by the AFL.

Despite its growth, critics charged

that Mine-Mill was a "Communist dominated" union.

The

union's expansion engendered internal dissension from rightwing members and external attacks from government officials
and capitalist employers.

Evidence indicates that red

baiting stemmed more from power struggles among union
officers and their conflicts over the direction of the
union's future, rather than simply ideological differences.
Historians of Mine-Mill agree that the union was
strengthened by government guarantees of union security from
1937 to 1945.3

They recognize the benefits industrial

unions derived from the 1942 "maintenance of membership"
formula that automatically enrolled new workers in unions.
Despite the CIO's impressive growth, some labor historians
have criticized its wartime alliance with the government,
and specifically the Democratic party.

In Labor's War at

Home. Nelson Lichtenstein shows the postwar costs of the
CIO's support for Franklin Roosevelt's war mobilization
plan.

Lichtenstein concludes that labor's accommodation

with the state was a "Faustian bargain" that led to a
conservative and bureaucratic labor movement which
suppressed labor militancy during the Cold War.4
Because he limited his study to only four, albeit
major, CIO unions, Lichtenstein ignored both the nonferrous
metals industry and the so-called "left-led" unions.

Mine-

Mill, a fragile union in a geographically diverse and
oligopolistic industry, owed its institutional life to
successful NLRB certification elections.

An examination of

Mine-Mill at the local level shows that its wartime reliance
on the state labor mechanism was a strategic move that
finally forced recalcitrant employers to bargain with
democratically-elected unions.
My focus on Mine-Mill places this study under the
rubric of "union-centered" or "neo-institutional" labor
history.5

This method recognizes, as Howard Kimeldorf

asserts, that unions are
not only economically-based interest groups but
potential vehicles of social change, whose social
importance lay in providing the principal means
through which wage earners, one of the two great
classes created by the industrial revolution,
constituted themselves as an organized force
capable of influencing the direction of modern
society.6
The labor union, through its ability to mobilize,
shape, and articulate class desires and grievances, is
nothing less than the potential or actual locus of workingclass power against capitalist hegemony.

This does not deny

union conservatism or class collaborationism; nor does it
neglect the racist, sexist, and provincial aspects of the
American working class.

However, when fused with workers'

own moral and ethical sensibilities, the labor union wields
a collective power that directly contrasts with the freemarket notion of libertarian individualism that isolates the
wage worker as an economic commodity and a mere consumer of
xiii

production.

Recent debates, harkening back to the origins

of American labor history, have affirmed the efficacy of
this type of historical analysis.7
David Brody has urged that scholars once again place
"institutions and power relations at the center of labor
history."8

The study of trade unions and their goal of

collective bargaining was the focus of the "old" Wisconsin
school of labor history, led by economists John Commons and
Selig Perlman, after the turn of the twentieth century.

As

the first attempt at an interpretative framework, the
Commons-Perlman thesis located the character of the American
working class in its conservative, "jobs-conscious" trade
unions.9
Beginning in the 1960s, the "new" social and labor
historians reacted against what they saw as the Wisconsin
school's narrow conceptualization of the working class,
particularly the exclusion of the vast majority of the
nonunion labor force, including women, blacks, and ethnic
immigrants.10

They used both class and culture to analyze

worker behavior, asserting that it was not accommodation,
but resistance to capitalism based on premodern workplace
customs and community morals, that best characterized
American workers.11
The exclusion of labor unions from American workingclass history runs the risk, as Jean Monds has argued, of
"denuding this history of its essential political content."
xiv

Despite the perceived ascendence of culture studies over
class analysis, the labor union has remained a central
aspect of working-class history.

In the process of

recovering a vast range of previously ignored subjects, many
historians never abandoned the study of labor unions.
Instead, they have applied more sophisticated techniques and
varied theoretical frameworks to examine them at the
community and national level.

The best of these studies

acknowledge the labor union's "centrality to working-class
mobilization and social change."12
In the following chapters I examine the Ely-area MineMill locals during a critical transformation in class
relations.

To be sure, the Ely district of the 1930s and

1940s contained a diverse social milieu.

The existence of

two large capitalist enterprises determined, for the most
part, the area's social formation.

In the segmented labor

force of western company towns and copper camps, AngloAmerican skilled craftsmen held the few high-wage jobs.
Unskilled whites, blacks, and first- and second-generation
European, Asian, and Mexican immigrants occupied the large
number of lower-paid positions as semiskilled operatives and
laborers.

Some women worked for wages in secretarial and

service occupations, but most were relegated to domestic
non-wage labor as housewives and mothers until 1943, when a
labor shortage forced the company to hire them as industrial
workers.

White, male workers were union members and claimed
xv

an economically privileged position in the hierarchy of the
working-class community.

That women and nonwhite workers

influenced this process is certainly undeniable and demands
further study.
This study contributes to our heretofore limited
knowledge of Nevada's twentieth-century working-class
history.

In 1994, as some of the state's largest employers

seek a return to open-shop welfare capitalism, it must be
remembered that workers in the past successfully opposed
these antilabor practices through the organization of labor
unions.

This is critical in the coming years when workers

need to know that their desire for security, dignity, and a
decent life is linked to a tradition of resistance to
capitalist exploitation and degradation.
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CHAPTER 1
THE POLITICS OF ORGANIZATION: THE INTERNATIONAL UNION
OF MINE, MILL AND SMELTER WORKERS, 1892-1940

Few American labor unions can match the radical,
discordant, and sometimes tragic history of the
International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers and
its predecessor, the Western Federation of Miners (WFM).
Formed as an institutional response to capitalist mining,
the WFM was the predominant working-class force in the West
during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century.
Sundered by ideological dissension, the WFM shifted from
syndicalism to conservatism during its volatile two-decade
existence.

Its legacy of promise and despair lingered long

in the memories of Western miners and labor militants.
Vernon Jensen aptly described the WFM as "the paragon of
democratic, industrial unionism, the pride of many
Socialists, the scorn of the leaders of the AFL until
affiliation was belatedly worked out, the founder of the
IWW..., and the valiant defender of the rights of unionism
in many struggles throughout the West...."1
Unionism had existed in the mining West since the
1860s.

Local unions in Nevada, Montana, and Colorado had
1

2
some success in dictating wage and hour rates around the
region's mines and mills until the 1880s.

As mining

operations grew increasingly larger, employers began
organizing in opposition to workers' control, using both the
state and Pinkerton detectives to break strikes aimed at
opposing wage reductions.
First conceived in 1892 during a class war between
striking miners and employers at Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, the
WFM was formally established a year later when forty
delegates met at Butte, Montana to form a regional
federation of existing local unions.2

Its constitution

outlined the WFM's original goals: union recognition and the
closed shop, a fair wage ("just compensation for our
labor"), arbitration and conciliation to resolve industrial
disputes, and improved health and safety laws.

They sought

to eliminate employers' private armies, the use Pinkerton of
detectives, convict and child labor, and payment in scrip.3
The document also provided for the appointment of
organizers "to organize all nonunion miners."

Richard

Lingenfelter notes that the WFM clearly recognized that
haphazard organization in the past had undermined incipient
unionism.

As a result, only a quarter of the region's

30,000 miners belonged to unions.

Lingenfelter credits WFM

organizers for the union's substantial membership growth and
economic power over the next decade.4
The WFM briefly affiliated with the AFL from 1896 until
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1898, when members grew increasingly frustrated with the
AFL's dilatory bargaining tactics and lack of financial
support for their strikes.

Members also opposed the AFL's

policy of craft unionism that organized workers into
autonomous locals by their respective trades.

Increasing

technologies in the metal mining industry created a
heterogeneous workforce consisting of miners, craftsmen,
semiskilled operatives, and unskilled laborers.

WFM members

believed that craft unionism blunted class-consciousness by
separating workers by trade and that only through industrial
unionism— one union for an entire industry— could workers
recognize their common interest.5
Once free from the AFL's class collaborationism, the
WFM spearheaded the formation of anticapitalist alternative
federations that culminated in 1905 with the syndicalist
Industrial Workers of the World (IWW).

Both organizations

originally defended the concept of local autonomy within a
democratic and decentralized organizational structure,
eschewed time contracts, and advocated the use of strikes to
achieve workers' demands.

In 1907 the WFM reached its peak

as the IWW's metal mining division, claiming 40,000 members
in nearly 200 locals.6
The WFM was increasingly split between radicals who
advocated syndicalist unionism and socialist politics and
moderates who favored "pure and simple" economic goals.
Moderates, especially those living in established

communities, increasingly rejected the IWW's emphasis on the
class struggle for more accommodationist tactics,

in 1908,

the WFM separated from the IWW as the first step towards
reconciliation with the AFL, which it rejoined in 1911 with
jurisdiction over all workers in the nonferrous metals
industry.7
Encountering increased employer opposition that
reflected a national open-shop movement, the WFM's
membership steadily declined after disastrous strikes
decimated several important locals.

At its annual

convention in 1916, the union was renamed the International
Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, ostensibly to
recognize its jurisdiction now extended beyond the West.
The name change can also be viewed as a semantic effort to
distance the union from its radical past.8
Following World War I, Mine-Mill's decline continued as
conservative leaders failed to revive the moribund union.
After the resignation of long-time president Charles Moyer
in 1926, organizational disarray was apparent: conventions
were held irregularly and sparsely attended, and almost all
international officers and board members doubled as working
miners and smeltermen.

An international organization in

name only, Mine-Mill languished through the first years of
the Great Depression, paralleling the devastated economic
fortunes of the metals industry.9
Like many other unions in the 1930s, Mine-Mill
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benefitted from the breakdown of "New Era" economics that
paved the way for a restructuring of American industrial
relations.

In 1933 the union was a mere remnant of the WFM

with only six active locals and 1500 members.10

Over the

next decade Mine-Mill recovered, aided at the national level
by three developments: New Deal labor legislation, the rise
of CIO and industrial unionism, and the return of prosperity
to the metals industry created by defense-era and then
wartime demand.
Mine-Mill, along with much of the American organized
labor movement, directly benefitted from New Deal labor
legislation that, for the first time, gave government
sanction to unionism.

The National Industrial Recovery Act

(NIRA), enacted in June 1933, reinvigorated organized labor.
In its most famous passage, the NIRA's Section 7(a) affirmed
the right of workers in America's industrial sector to
organize and bargain collectively through elected union
representatives.

Although the provision proved impossible

to enforce and was, along with the rest of the NIRA,
ultimately struck down as unconstitutional, it spurred
organization not only among the established craft unions,
but also among industrial workers long-ignored by the
AFL.11
Following the demise of the NIRA, union growth was
again stimulated by the passage of the Wagner Act in July
1935, particularly after the Supreme Court affirmed its

6
constitutionality two years later.

The Wagner Act gave

further impetus to the rising industrial union movement by
upholding the principle of majority rule, initially
mandating that employers bargain exclusively with one
democratically-elected union.

It also strengthened the

National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB) power to hold
certification elections, force employers to negotiate, and
curb many anti-union practices.12
The NLRB's increased power to compel union recognition
directly aided Mine-Mill's growth.

This was evident at many

Southwestern copper mines where employer intimidation had
long stifled unionism.

Claiming that it was "the answer to

the workers' problems," a Mine-Mill organizer working in New
Mexico in 1930s recounted that the Wagner Act "was the first
time that we had some semblance of government
protection."13

After 1933, workers throughout the

nonferrous metals industry began forming their own locals,
constituting a growing membership that soon surpassed the
international union's organizational capabilities.
In June 1933, delegates from Mine-Mill's remaining
locals promised an aggressive drive to take advantage of
this spontaneous organization.

This campaign was led by a

diverse combination of old AFL craft unionists, former WFM
and IWW members, and, what Jensen termed "a new crop of
radicals reaching to the Communist fringe."14

The next

year, the union experienced a tenfold expansion, claiming
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15,000 members in ninety-four locals.
increased to 26,000 in 132 locals.15

By 1935 membership
A year later, Thomas

Brown, the union's president, was expelled.

His exit

signaled a new era for Mine-Mill, one that would witness the
resurfacing of an ideological split similar to the division
that had devastated the WFM.
At the center of this controversy was Reid Robinson.
In 1936, Robinson, just twenty-eight years old, was elected
Mine-Mill president.

The son of a Butte Mine-Mill officer

who had migrated throughout the western United States and
Canada, Robinson had witnessed the General Strike of 1919 as
a Seattle newsboy.

When his family returned to Butte in

1921, he briefly worked in the copper mines before entering
local union office in the early 1930s for the Butte Miners'
Local No. 1, Mine-Mill's strongest local.

Robinson served

as a convention delegate and, owing to his immense
rhetorical skills and aggressive floor style, quickly rose
to the head of the union.

Although initially part of a

conservative coalition, Robinson gradually advanced a leftwing, progressive agenda that alienated his former
supporters.16
Robinson followed Brown's 1935 decision to align MineMill with United Mine Workers (UMW) president, John L.
Lewis's insurgent Committee for Industrial Organization
(CIO) that split the AFL and the entire American labor
movement between craft and industrial unionism.

Mine-Mill
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leaders repeatedly encountered jurisdictional disputes with
AFL machinists and other craft unions.

Particularly odious

were the AFL's "back door" agreements— secret contracts
between craft unions and employers prior to NLRB elections—
that excluded the large number of semiskilled operatives and
laborers employed in the metals industry.17

In 1938, Mine-

Mill, for the second time in its history, left the AFL when
the federation expelled the eight CIO unions.18
Although hardly a dominant union in the CIO, claiming
just three percent of its membership, Mine-Mill was, as
Vernon Jensen remarked, "in the company of a thriving
industrial union movement."19

However, Jensen's

observation assumes that the CIO unions, and specifically
Mine-Mill, had the institutional capability to take full
advantage of their independence.

Unlike the United

Automobile Workers, for example, Mine-Mill clearly lacked a
base of well-placed rank-and-file activists and organizers
in key locals.20
Despite affiliation with the newly-christened
Congress of Industrial Organizations, Mine-Mill's growth
slowed as the initial heady effect of the Wagner Act
evaporated in the face of open-shop employers' organized
opposition to the New Deal.21

The 1937-38 "Roosevelt

recession" further slowed the revival of metals industry
unionism, as Mine-Mill attracted a paltry 800 new
members.22

The AFL's Metal Trades Department also launched

its own organizational push that helped regain some of the
support it had lost to the industrial unions.23

Once

again, Mine-Mill's expansion sputtered.
Mine-Mill's cycle of growth and stagnation reflected
its failure to place organizers in communities where
employers used welfare capitalism or open-shop tactics to
quell incipient unionism.

In such company towns and mining

camps, organizers were needed either to recruit skeptical
workers or to instruct militant workers how to circumvent
employer opposition, apply for a union charter, and then
petition for an NLRB election.

Despite ambitious rhetoric

during the late 1930s, union officers lacked adequate
operating expenses to hire a sufficient number of
organizers.
What organizational thrust existed was supplied by the
members themselves.

Chase Powers, who later became a Mine-

Mill organizer and Board Member, recalled that "there were
no organizers," when he and other Oakland, California tunnel
workers applied for a charter in 1934.

Mine-Mill "was too

weak," Powers added, "so we organized ourselves.1,24 Vern
Curtis, a Bisbee, Arizona copper miner who became a Board
Member in the 1960s, remembers that until 1937 "we never had
any help at all."

Nor did Mine-Mill have the money to begin

an adequate campaign.

Curtis noted it was "a broke union"

that "didn't have the operating expenses and money to assign
people to assist [us]."25
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After affiliation with the CIO, Robinson took action to
correct Mine-Mill's organizational deficiencies.

Powers,

hired as an international representative in 1936, saw a
"natural chain of circumstances" shaping this decision.

He

claimed that Robinson, raised among conservative Butte
unionists, was radicalized by CIO leaders like Lewis, Harry
Bridges, head of the powerful International Longshoremen's
and Warehousemen's Union, and the United Electrical Workers'
Albert Fitzgerald.

Taking his cue from these militant

leaders, Robinson "reflected this association and knowledge
back in his [own] union."26
Robinson discovered that strategically-placed activists
in the field and the front office could overcome Mine-Mill's
lack of financial resources.

He duplicated Lewis's use of

Communist and left-wing organizers with the Steelworkers
Organizing Committee (SWOC) 27

Unable to obtain a

sufficient operating budget, Robinson had to find people
willing to work for little pay.

Experienced, left-wing

organizers, dedicated to promoting organized labor, fit the
bill.

Again emulating other CIO leaders, Robinson

established organizing projects independent of the union's
Executive Board, assigning the newly-hired organizers to
build locals at Connecticut brass refineries, Southwestern
copper districts, Idaho silver mines, and eastern Canadian
gold fields.

Assembling a staff to handle the increased

activity, Robinson hired a research director, a publicity
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director, and named his own editor of the Mine-Mill edition
of the CIO News.

Powers recalled that during this period

Mine-Mill "learned the techniques of organizing" other CIO
leaders had used so effectively.28
Robinson's bold action elicited protests from moderate
Mine-Mill officials.

In Mine-Mill's hierarchy, Board

Members from the union's seven districts held votes on the
Executive Board.

As president, Robinson did not possess a

vote and, if faced with a hostile Board, had to gain consent
for his policies through rank-and-file support.

By 1940, a

majority of Board Members increasingly objected to
Robinson's organizational tactics, which they perceived as a
threat to their power.
Board Members initially tolerated, but soon came to
resent the new left-wing organizers when it became clear
that new members were loyal to Robinson.

As Powers

remembered, "all the left-wing militant guys...did the
organizing" in districts that lacked competent rank-and-file
organizers.

New members "didn't know who [their Board

Member] was....They didn't know anybody but these [leftwing] organizers and Reid Robinson...."

When Board Members

started losing the support of the members in their
districts, "the friction began" between them and
Robinson.29
By 1940, Robinson's organizational strategy exacerbated
ideological differences that echoed the dissensions of the
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WFM era.

Realizing that the Depression and subsequent New

Deal labor legislation had created a more militant worker
who demanded union representation, left-wing members
complained that moderate leaders underestimated the rankand-file's desire for immediate organization.

Because Mine-

Mill needed additional organizers to take full advantage of
this new militancy, provincial Board Members opposed to the
hiring of outside organizers stifled the union's growth.
Moderates further obstructed expansion by defeating a dues
increase necessary to build an effective organizational
staff.30
Moderates, usually holdovers from the 1920s, responded
by red-baiting Robinson, claiming that the Communist Party
had taken control of the union.

They defended opposition to

his policies by invoking the union's tradition of local
autonomy and democratic unionism and linking those practices
to the glory days of the WFM and the IWW.31

Missing from

the moderate's critique were two crucial points.
those days were long gone.

First,

Changes in both the structure of

the metals industry and the national political economy
necessitated centralized organization.

Second, the WFM had

failed, doomed by its own internal ideological differences
and weak regional structure.
Dedicated to organizing the entire nonferrous metals
industry along industrial lines, Robinson, in fact, never
advocated jettisoning Mine-Mill's impressive democratic
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credentials, established through the use of the referendum,
convention resolutions, as well as rank-and-file election of
officers and ratification of contracts.

He did realize that

without a strong, national organizational structure the
union was both anachronistic and institutionally unstable.
Unlike the union's moderate members, Robinson understood the
CIO's main mission from the late 1930s through the 1940s:
"organize the unorganized.11
Improving economic conditions soon set the stage for a
ambitious organizational campaign.

Defense-era and then

World War II demand for all metals, but especially copper,
shifted labor market forces to the union's side,
particularly in the Intermountain West.32

The extensive

use of copper in war materiel, mainly in the manufacture of
cartridge casings, ignited an industry-wide boom.

Beginning

in 1939, copper production rose rapidly until domestic
consumption reached record levels by 1943.33
Although copper producers complained that legislation
froze many prices during the war while excess profits taxes
diminished the accumulation of large cash reserves, the
industry was once again financially stable.

Their primary

problem was an acute labor shortage that prevented the
maximum production required to reap the full rewards of
guaranteed government demand.

A need for workers curtailed

management's usual methods of resisting unionism and allowed
Mine-Mill a unique opportunity to gain a foothold in areas
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that had long proved difficult to organize.34
With prosperity's return to the nonferrous metals
industry, Mine-Mill embarked on an organizational drive
aimed at the nation's top metal producers.

Its primary

target was the one hundred thousand workers employed by the
"Big Five" copper companies— Anaconda, American Smelting and
Refining, American Metals, Phelps Dodge, and, based
primarily in the Southwest, Kennecott.35

This important

campaign did not, however, diminish Mine-Mill's internal
dissension.

During their attempt to organize Western

copperworkers, its leaders continued to debate the politics
of organization.
As Nelson Lichtenstein has shown, labor's rise in the
1930s was an "unfinished struggle."

For Mine-Mill and the

other CIO unions, the New Deal did not mean that mass
organization was a fait accompli.

Instead, they confronted

an array of problems: employer opposition, internal
divisions and financial difficulties, NLRB policies that
increasingly worked against industrial unionism, and
apathetic and resistant workers split along ethnic lines.
An examination of one Intermountain West community
highlights the difficulties that Mine-Mill encountered
during its sometimes frustrating campaign to organize the
nation's copper industry.36
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CHAPTER TWO
"WELL CONSTRUCTED HOUSES" AND "WELL-KEPT STREETS":
THE ELY DISTRICT, 1902-1929

I.
Organizing the Western copperworkers was a crucial link
to Mine-Mill's strategy of representing all the nation's
copperworkers and a prerequisite for establishing postwar
industry-wide bargaining.

An integral part of Kennecott's

holdings, the Ely district stood on the northwestern point
of a copper rectangle encompassing the company's other mines
and smelters in Utah, New Mexico, and Arizona.1
Located in the Great Basin of east-central Nevada, the
Ely district was the home of Kennecott's Nevada Consolidated
Copper Corporation.

Their economic supremacy of the area

was symbolized by the massive smelterworks at McGill, a
company town of 3,000 people, thirteen miles north of Ely,
the White Pine County seat.

This plant processed ore

shipped by rail from the company's own open-pit mine at
Ruth, and from Consolidated Coppermines's Kimberly
underground mines, both twenty-two miles to the southwest.
As the state's largest industrial enterprise, Nevada
Consolidated dominated economic life in the Ely district,
20
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employing over one thousand workers at the mines and
smelter. Consolidated Coppermines, about one-third
Kennecott's size, employed an additional 500 hundred
workers.2
Despite the electrical industry's heavy demand for the
highly-conductive and durable metal since the 1880s, largescale production of Ely district copper deposits did not
begin until after the turn of the century.3

Mining the

low-grade (less than two percent of the surrounding rock)
copper deposits— called "western porphyries"— was not
profitable until Daniel Jackling applied the open-pit
techniques used in Minnesota iron mining to Bingham Canyon,
Utah in 1905.4 Because it is found in minute particles
spread throughout a large area, porphyry copper must be
mined in huge quantities to be cost effective.

In what he

described as "mass production mining," Jackling took
advantage of economies of scale by doubling the amount of
ore sent through the smelting process.

Although his

original processing methods were primitive, improved
reduction techniques allowed for higher recovery rates,
making open-pit copper mining even more profitable by the
1920s.5
Because open-pit mining was such a massive undertaking,
an equally enormous initial capital investment was required
for heavy machinery, a nearby smelting plant to lower
shipping costs, and a railroad to quickly move the ore
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through the production process.

This immense cost meant

that corporate capitalists, usually Easterners who possessed
access to large capital markets, controlled the production
of western porphyry copper.

The Ely district was no

exception.6
Five years prior to Jackling's innovation, miners began
small-scale development of the porphyry copper deposits
found in mountains west of the town of Ely.

Subsequent

development followed a familiar frontier pattern; small-time
speculators first staked out claims which they then sold to
regional entrepreneurs, who, in turn, were bought out by
corporate capitalists.7
The Ely district had been the site of gold and silver
mining until 1900.

In 1903, Mark Requa, the son of a

wealthy Nevada miner and railroad owner, formed what would
become the Nevada Consolidated Copper Company.

He combined

several of his own claims with other properties he purchased
from two California miners, who three years earlier had
first realized the potential wealth in the district's vast
copper reserves.

The same year that Requa appeared on the

scene, the Giroux Consolidated Company began a separate
mining operation at nearby Pilot Knob, later known as
Kimberly.

By September 1906, Requa had completed the Nevada

Northern railroad, connecting Ely with the Southern Pacific
trunk line 140 miles to the north.

Despite his ambitious

moves, he lacked sufficient capital to efficiently exploit
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the district's western porphyries.
Eastern capitalists, who had increasingly financed
Requa's expansion, entered the district in late 1905.

The

Cumberland-Ely Company, controlled by the Guggenheim
brothers, the principal backers of Jackling's Utah ventures,
began buying shares of Nevada Consolidated stock and
acquiring selected property, including the vital water
rights essential for a large smelter works.

Next, the

Cumberland-Ely combined with Requa to finance a 10,000-ton
smelter and reduction works at McGill.

In 1905 the

Guggenheims finally ousted Requa from Nevada Consolidated
when they acquired a majority of the company's stock.

Their

initial development phase ended when the railroad reached
the expanding open-pit mine at Ruth.

By 1908, both the mine

and smelter were operating at peak capacity.

Thereafter,

copper production became the central economic concern of all
but a handful of the district's residents for the next
three-quarters of a century.8
A corporate structure soon emerged.

In 1910, Jackling

augmented his copper operations in Utah, New Mexico and
Arizona, with the acquisition of a half-interest in Nevada
Consolidated.

Jackling continued to manage the operation

even after the Guggenheims' Kennecott Copper Corporation
began absorbing Nevada Consolidated in 1915, acquiring full
control in 1933.

At Kimberly, the Giroux properties merged

with several adjoining claims to form the Consolidated
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Coppermines.

Although an independent operation,

Consolidated Coppermines paid a fee to have its ore refined
at Nevada Consolidated's McGill smelter.9
Beginning in 1908, the district's economic fortunes
reflected the rise and fall of Nevada Consolidated's balance
sheet.

During the first decade of production, rising prices

spurred a boom in the copper industry that continued through
World War I, when profits soared aided by government price
supports.

Once the war ended, the copper market sagged amid

a worldwide economic slump as overproduction and sluggish
demand sent the industry reeling.

Ely-area production even

ceased for a brief period during the early 1920s.

The

industry rebounded by 1925, and prosperity continued through
the end of the decade, when Kennecott's corporate profits
peaked at over $50 million.10

II.
Militant unionism and periodic strikes had erupted in
Ely district from 1902 to 1919.

Labor unions preceded

Requa's entrance into the district.

A 1903 labor dispute at

the New York and Nevada Copper Company had ended violently
when the company's general manager murdered three union
miners.11

In 1908, the same year Nevada Consolidated began

operation, the WFM issued charters to the McGill
smelterworkers and the Lane City miners' union, which
included the miners at Ruth and Kimberly.

Both locals
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opposed the importation of "new" immigrant laborers, brought
into the district by the Guggenheim-Jackling interests to
fill the numerous unskilled jobs created by open-pit mining.
Although native-born and immigrant workers occasionally
united to protest common grievances, the district's workers
were often divided along ethic and skill lines.12
The copperworkers also organized in opposition to the
corporate capitalists.

In 1909, as smelterworkers and

miners struck to protest wage cuts, WFM members built a
labor headquarters just outside McGill, on what one
organizer called "the small portion of this planet that does
not belong to the Guggenheims.1,13 Radical unionism entered
the district at this time when the IWW established a
headquarters near Ruth, at Riepetown.

Indicating their

growing class-consciousness, workers also formed political
organizations, including a labor party and Socialist local
in 1911.14
Labor militancy exposed management's penchant for
violence.

In 1912, a central council of all the district's

workers, in a rare display of unity, voted to support a WFMsanctioned walkout at Jackling's Bingham copper pit.

They

added their own grievances, demanding a wage increase and
union recognition.

A general strike followed on October 14.

Nevada Consolidated hired strikebreakers and armed guards to
intimidate WFM picketers.

On the strike's fourth day,

company police murdered two striking Greek immigrants.
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Nevada Governor Tasker Oddie then broke the strike by
ordering the state police into the district to help the
company resume operations.

Nevada Consolidated stonewalled

the governor's feeble attempt to mediate the conflict,
although the company ultimately granted a twenty-five cent
raise.

However, it refused to recognize the union or to

rehire workers who were active in the strike, a policy
Jackling dispassionately defended as "good judgement.1,15
Sharing none of the copper industry's sizable wartime
profits, labor remained militant through World War I16 as
rising living costs led to increased dissatisfaction.17
During the war, armed soldiers guarded the Nevada
Consolidated properties "simply to keep agitators out" of
the district, and deputies searched incoming trains for
suspected labor organizers.18
worker militancy.

These measures did not quell

Citing the need for a wage adjustment,

Nevada Northern railroad workers twice walked off their
jobs.

The most radical response to wartime conditions

occurred at Kimberly in September 1918.

Fifty IWW miners,

demanding "better sanitary conditions, better lights,

[and

a] more liberal food allowance," vowed not to return to work
until "war prisoners"— antiwar activists convicted under the
Espionage Act— were released from federal penitentiaries.19
After the war, workers pressured Nevada Consolidated to
make good on a promised wage increase.

Beginning in January

1919, organized workers repeatedly walked off their jobs.

This agitation culminated in July when the McGill
smelterworkers, demanding an additional $1.25 per day and
improved medical benefits, called a general strike against
the advice of Mine-Mill's international leadership.

Federal

and state mediators, including Governor Emmett Boyle,
negotiated a settlement in late August that included a
meager seventy-five cents wage increase.

To compensate for

the difference between the workers' original demands and the
final settlement, the company established a commissary where
food would be "sold practically at cost" and, to save on
winter heating costs, lowered the price of coal, which it
had traditionally sold to the workers.

The 1919 strike

concluded a turbulent era of labor relations.

During the

next decade, militancy diminished as Nevada Consolidated's
policy of welfare capitalism led organized workers to
develop new strategies to mediate their grievances.20

III.
The social relations of production that emerged from
the rationalization of copper mining in the American West
were based on a patriarchal system of class power.

In

isolated industrial communities, mutual obligations were
acknowledged by employers and workers through a system of
paternalism which recognized the interdependency of both
classes.

As Eugene Genovese has shown in his study of

southern slave society, paternalism is a "particular
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relationship...of class power" that "[grows] out of the need
to...morally justify a system of exploitation."

Managers in

the western copper industry similarly assumed the
patriarchal responsibilities of plantation masters in an
attempt to discipline their workforce and to legitimize
their social domination.21
From the beginning, Nevada Consolidated established a
tradition of paternalism.

The company had built homes at

McGill smelter for the company's executives, foremen, and
skilled craftsmen in 1908, the year the plant commenced
operations.

Citing an early real-estate boom, Russell

Elliott maintains that the company had originally planned
for workers to house their families away from the smelter
and mines in growing residential areas near Ely.

However,

his assessment discounts management's early recognition of
the need to attract a large and dependable workforce to the
geographically-isolated copper district.22
From the outset, the company controlled the development
of the smelter town.

By 1910, company control was evident

in the town's appearance.

Elliott recalls the

row upon row of well constructed houses, confusingly
alike...; the rather broad and generally well-kept
streets; the lack of hotels and the scarcity of saloons
along the main street; and the fact that there was no
restricted [red-light] district within the town
area.23
As increasingly practiced throughout the mining West
after the turn of the century, paternalism embraced much of
the community's social and political realm: local government
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was nonexistent, company approval was required to operate a
business, and hospital,24 water, and sanitation facilities
were provided by the employer.

In McGill, the company even

helped finance the construction of ethnic churches.25
Apologists of paternalism mistakenly claim that these
amenities were "furnished free," but clearly they were
purchased with profits, which instead of going into workers'
paychecks were spent by company fiat.
The most glaring example of company domination at
McGill was the residential segregation by class and
ethnicity, a spatial reflection of workplace hierarchies.
Company executives lived in the "charmed circle," an arc of
stately Victorian homes around a verdant park overlooking
the town.

Skilled white workers and managers lived in

comfortable homes in "Middle Town," while lower-paid whites
lived in the "Upper" and "Lower" townsites.

Immigrant

workers, who had arrived from nearby states or directly from
their native country, were segregated into the demeaninglynamed "Jap Town," "Greek Town," and "Austrian Town."26
Defenders of this policy regard it as merely the company's
formal recognition of the immigrants' "natural desire" to
live among their fellow countrymen.

But this view

disregards elementary causation— it was the company
managers, not the workers, who decided the housing
assignments.27
Segregation was an instrumentalist corporate policy

that resulted in a divided working-class split along ethnic
lines.

Despite Elliott's assertion to the contrary, ethnic

workers were never integrated into the organized labor
movement until the mid-1940s.

Physically separated from the

rest of the heterogeneous community, Anglo-American workers
developed a nativist, self-conscious concept of
"Americanism" to differentiate themselves from the other
workers.

Anglo-American workers blamed the immigrants for

lowering the district's standard of living because the
newcomers did not appreciate the unique gains made by
organized labor in the American working-class struggle.
This distorted consciousness stood in opposition to the
inclusivity of industrial unionism that would have united
all the district's workers across ethnic lines.

It remained

an obstacle Mine-Mill organizers could only partially
remove.
Company paternalistic practices prior to 1919 proved an
ineffective method of quelling labor militancy.

During the

next decade, Nevada Consolidated's management, like many
large firms throughout the country influenced by
Progressive-Era notions of industrial relations, developed a
policy of welfare capitalism in an attempt to curb employee
dissatisfaction and thus destroy radical unionism.

This

strategy expanded the company's paternalistic role into the
workers' cultural realm by providing services and benefits
that were not a "necessity of the industry" or essential to
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maintain class domination.

Welfare capitalism sought to

boost employee morale and link the company and workers
together in a common partnership.

Richard Meltzer has

accurately characterized welfare capitalism as management's
attempt "to kill union activity with corporate kindness."28
Under general manager J. C. Kinnear's leadership in the
1920s, welfare capitalism served as Nevada Consolidated's
hedge against labor agitation.

Kinnear, a college-educated

engineer from Massachusetts, had been a strikebreaker in IWW
and WFM strikes in Goldfield, Nevada in 1907.

Transferred

to McGill in 1910 after he was hired by Jackling's Utah
Copper, he impressed Nevada Consolidated's key officers,
rising to de facto chief of the entire Ely operation in
1922. Kinnear's management style straddled the line between
the increasingly anachronistic manager and the emerging
bureaucrat.

His ability to maintain personal relationships

with his employees endeared him to many McGill residents,
especially skilled workers who shared his concept of manly
comportment.

However, Kinnear's "primary mission" was "to

run a financially successful mining and milling operation."
Diminishing the power of labor unions through welfare
capitalism was one means of accomplishing this mission.29
Welfare capitalism became entrenched by 1925 after the
Ely district recovered from the postwar depression and a
fire that destroyed the smelter.

Once the smelter was

rebuilt, Kinnear earnestly applied this system, aided by
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industry-wide prosperity.

Kinnear's son, who also became a

Kennecott executive, later recalled that workers had
traditionally "expected a large company to take a
paternalist (father-son) attitude.1,30 Evidence suggests,
however, that workers' demands were limited to decent wages
and safe working conditions.31

Instead, it was the company

that brought great expectations into the arena of labor
relations.
All welfare capitalist projects were designed by
management to steer their employees' allegiance to the
company through identification with the community.

This was

evident in various community beautification projects and the
promotion of rivalries between the smelter and mining towns.
The company reproduced this system generationally by
guaranteeing employment to the sons of McGill families.

In

Nevada Consolidated's system of welfare capitalism, class
was subsumed by fealty to the community and, by extension,
loyalty to the company.32
To some observers, the 1920s represented an era of
stability in the Ely district.

By mid-decade, the services

provided at the "model" company towns at McGill and Ruth
effectively circumvented the role of working-class
institutions.33

Expanding its domination outside the

workplace, the company limited the local labor supply,
guaranteed good wages, and sponsored athletic teams,
fraternal organizations, and other social and recreational
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activities.
This strategy engendered loyalty from many of the
townspeople— an implicit consent which the company
maintained across class lines.

In her analysis of Lansing,

Michigan's Reo Motor Car Company, Lisa Fine interprets
welfare capitalism as an "alliance" between male employers
and male workers.

Under this system, male workers,

increasingly losing autonomy on the factory floor to a
combination of Fordism and Taylorism, exchanged this loss of
job control for participation in the company "family."34
Fine's analysis helps to explain the social dynamics in
Nevada Consolidated's company towns.
Although Anglo-American workers stood atop a stratified
working-class community, all male wage earners were assured
a privileged place in its social hierarchy.

Despite the

presence of some unmarried male workers, the cornerstone of
the company town's social structure was the family.

By

providing a living wage and suitable housing, workers
experienced much of what constituted a middle-class
lifestyle— their wives did not work, their children attended
good primary and secondary schools, and they earned enough
discretionary income to allow for modest consumerism.35
Reo's system differed from Nevada Consolidated's in
several respects.

The auto industry was rapidly deskilling

its workforce through assembly line technology; in copper,
traditional skilled workers still remained.

The Reo
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workforce was mostly native-born and the company used an
"Americanization" program to integrate the minority of
foreign-born workers into the community.

At the Ely

district, there was a sizable foreign-born population, and
the company encouraged ethnic distinctions.

Finally, Reo

had an explicit open-shop policy, that included firing
suspected union members.

At Ely, skilled Anglo-American

workers openly claimed membership in craft locals.

Despite

Nevada Consolidated's comprehensive efforts to subvert class
consciousness, the company did not openly harass or dismiss
union members.

Given these differences, Fine's otherwise

trenchant model does not fully explain how the Ely
district's organized workers maintained an informal
equilibrium somewhere between the open shop and collective
bargaining.

IV.
Although Nevada Consolidated refused to recognize their
unions, Anglo-American skilled workers did not disband their
locals in the 1920s.

During a decade of nationwide employer

antiunionism, Mine-Mill Local 233, tracing its origins back
to WFM, remained active.

Some of its members also belonged

to the smelter's AFL craft unions, who claimed additional
supporters among the engineers, switchmen, and skilled
shopworkers employed by the Nevada Northern railroad.36
Ely-area craftsmen continued to pay union dues and hold
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meetings despite their failure to exercise a labor union's
most important economic function— described by Harvey
O'Connor as "hav[ing] the strength to tell the employer what
he should do in regard to his employees, within the
limitations imposed by collective bargaining.1,37 Given
Nevada Consolidated's history of antiunionism and the
apparent success of its welfare capitalist policy, why did
skilled workers maintain union locals?
The answer lies in understanding how workers perceived
unionism at this time— as part of an informal equilibrium
with an employer who refused to recognize their labor
unions.

The informal equilibrium was a process that allowed

them to keep their locals and to mediate industrial
relations without establishing formal collective bargaining
or resorting to militant action.

Balancing the interests of

labor and capital, this system replaced other means of
resolving class conflict by the mid-1920s.
At McGill, craftworkers did not forget their recent
militant past; nor did they embrace Nevada Consolidated's
welfare capitalism.
instructive.

The earlier strikes had been

The 1919 strike had showed they could make

clear material gains— the establishment of a commissary, for
example— even though the company refused to recognize their
union or to fully grant their wage demands.

By the 1920s,

formalized industrial relations was no longer a primary
goal.

Instead, the Ely-area craftworker sought security,
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job safety, and a decent standard of living, characterized
by a "saving wage" sufficient "to enable him to support
himself and his family in reasonable comfort, educate his
children, and save something for his old age."38

As they

became permanently settled in the community, craftworkers
devised a method to advance their interests and avoid
incurring the brunt of employer reaction.

This system

required both their accommodation to company hegemony and
the assertion of their perception of a labor unions'
function.
Craftworkers did not discard unionism because they
continued to view labor unions as the institution that had
fought and won security and modest prosperity for the
American working class.

Speaking for AFL members at the Ely

district's 1924 Labor Day celebration, C. E. Handwright
claimed that "organized labor...is responsible for the high
standard of living that is enjoyed in the United States."39
Unions were also the institution that separated native-born
craftsmen from immigrant industrial workers.

An Ely

newspaper editorial credited the AFL for its opposition to
"orientalism" and its determination to keep America a "white
man's country."A0

Unions did not function to overtly

challenge Nevada Consolidated in the economic realm.

But by

maintaining union locals, craftworkers simultaneously upheld
their conception of citizenship and class.
Nevada Consolidated had two primary considerations

regarding its workforce.

First, it had to maintain a

sufficient number of skilled workers and laborers in an
isolated area; and second, because the profit margin in
copper production was dependent on rapidly moving the ore
through the smelter, it could not afford to countenance
worker control of the production process.

The company used

welfare capitalism to assure a stable supply of skilled
workers and, as Fine shows, to prevent union interference on
the job.

The craftworkers' response— forming unions but not

formally challenging management prerogatives— was therefore
an adjustment to the company's policy of welfare capitalism.
The previous two decades had shown that the company
would resort to raw force or the power of the state to
prevail during times of industrial conflict.

However, after

the establishment of welfare capitalism, workers kept their
locals as a threat to extract small concessions out of
employers who were determined to quell labor conflict even
if it required paying higher wages or providing better
living conditions.

Active union members viewed industrial

relations at the smelter as a dynamic balancing act between
outright rejection of unionism and striking for formal
recognition.
The Ely-area also offers a unique case study because of
the contrast between organized smelterworkers and the
miners, who vacillated between radical unionism and
accommodation to the open shop.

Unionism in the mining
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camps reflected the boom-and-bust cycle of the mining West.
Unlike the smelterworkers, the miners' unions stressed
social as well as economic goals, as demonstrated by their
radical demands in 1918.

McGill was WFM and Mine-Mill

territory, while the mining camps were IWW turf.
Conversely, when the radical impulse was extinguished
in the 1920s, miners did not even retain the shell of a
functioning union.

At the Kimberly mine, where Consolidated

Coppermines could not command a stable workforce among the
transient miners, workers dismantled their locals for a
system that consisted of relatively high wages and
geographical mobility.

This arrangement allowed them to

leave the area if they disapproved of their working and
living conditions.

Thus the type of equilibrium carefully

cultivated among the smelter and railroad workers was
nonexistent at the mines, where the informal mediation
process consisted of simply staying or leaving.
Industrial relations broke down quickly when external
forces affected the informal equilibrium at the mines.

If

worker dissatisfaction with deteriorating living conditions
coincided with decreased mobility, miners tended to organize
spontaneously.

As miners rapidly shifted from nonexistent

unionism to militancy, mine employers, who rejected welfare
capitalism as an option to reestablish equilibrium, resorted
to repressive antiunion activities— blacklisting, hiring
labor spies, and employing dictatorial foremen.

These
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tactics only served to increase the miners' militancy.
This system would not be toppled until 1943, when MineMill joined local members to forge a new regime of
industrial relations.

In the interim, the two different

informal equilibriums would be severely tested during the
Great Depression, when New Deal labor legislation sparked
the Ely-district's copperworkers to seek institutional
solutions amid deteriorating economic conditions.
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1. Jensen, Nonferrous Metals Industry Unionism. 133-136. in
1946 the union developed a plan for an "Ideal Collective
Bargaining Structure" based on area-wide and industry-wide
units. Jensen is critical of the geographical strategy
because major producers preferred plant-by-plant bargaining.
He does, however, view Reid Robinson's company-by-company
approach as a "logical" step to industry-wide bargaining.
A1 Skinner, head of Mine Mill's postwar Kennecott council,
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Robinson wanted to ensure "the most satisfactory results" in
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Ruth copper pit, the Nevada Northern railroad, and the
McGill smelter, Kennecott's Nevada holdings accounted for
thirteen percent of the parent company's total output from
1916 to 1941, Navin, Copper Mining and Management. 263. The
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3. Navin, ibid.. 13; Hildebrand and Mangum, Capital and
Labor in American Copper. 94-95. Western copper mining
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inadequate transportation and low-grade deposits. Although
the telephone was invented in 1876 and Edison patented the
incandescent lamp in 1880, western miners did not begin
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production did not occur until the 1890s.
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4. Hildebrand and Mangum, ibid.. 37-41, contains Arthur B.
Parsons' description of the six characteristics of western
porphyry copper: (1) "Extensive" deposits that "can be mined
efficiently only at large scale, through underground block
caving or open pits"; (2) Uniform distribution of copper
throughout the ore preventing "selective" mining; (3) The
ore contains the presences of igneous rock, "either porphyry
or closely related rocks," indicating these rocks may have
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copper ore have been concentrated by...[a] natural leaching"
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and increase of depth," and the cost of extraction and
market price of the mineral "set the limits of mineable
ore"; and (6) the presence of "low-grade sulfide...requires
fine grinding and concentration before smelting."
5. Unlike underground mining where copper veins are
selectively extracted from the hard rock, in open-pit mining
steam shovels remove all the surface ore, which is then sent
to the mill where the copper is separated from the "slag,"
or nonmineral bearing ore. Through a process called
flotation, minute copper particles are separated from the
surrounding rock, concentrated at the mill, smelted into
sheets of "blister" copper, and then sent to refineries in
the East.
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million. Navin, Copper Mining and Management. 119n. See
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American West (New York, 1987), 111-114 for a typology of
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Misfortune and None of Mv Own": A New History of the
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9. Elliott, ibid.. 282-289; Stanley W. Paher, Nevada Ghost
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Kennecott7s Nevada Mines Division) acquired Consolidated
Coppermines in 1958.
10. Elliott, ibid.. 199-200, 294-295; Paher, ibid.. 231;
Navin, ibid.. 392.
11. Elliott, ibid.. 251-3. Miners formed the Robinson
Miners7 Union No. 175, a WFM local, to protest a fifty-cent
wage reduction, and company violations of the existing
eight-hour day. The murders effectively terminated the
short life of the union. This did not, however, "end[] Ely7s
labor troubles," as copper industry historian Ira Joralemon
claimed. Joralemon, ibid.. 239.
12. For a description of the Ely district7slabor history
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Elliott, ibid.. Chapter 9.
13. Harvey O 7Connor, The Guqgenheims; The Making of an
American Dvnastv (New York, 1937), 387. In 1909,
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until 1911. Elliott, ibid.. 258-9.
14. Elliott, ibid.. 259.
15. Elliott, ibid..
263-268; Jensen, Heritage ofConflict.
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peace" reigned in the Nevada mining areas until World War I,

43
a situation he credits to the "excellent self-restraint of
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1917-1918," (Nevada), Appendix to Journals of Senate and
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Instead, he identifies two sections: "'the charmed circle'"
where the executives and their families lived; and the rest
of the "segregated community" which contained southern
European and Japanese immigrants, "the primary labor force
for the copper industry." Fleming claims segregation was
the result of "a number of reasons," including the desire to
maintain "different languages and the traditional cultures
... transferred from native lands."
27. Elliott, Growing U p in a Company Town. 27-29. He calls
this the "silliest thing to develop" from Anglo-American
workers' early opposition to immigrant labor, but does not
"believe that company officials deliberately sought to
establish a company town based on economic and racial
discrimination."
28. Richard Meltzer, "'Phelps Dodge Knows Best': Welfare
Capitalism in a New Mexico Camp, Dawson, 1920-1929,
Southwest Economy and Society 6 (1982), 12; Stuart Brandes,
American Welfare Capitalism. 1880-1940 (Chicago, 1970), 5-6.
Studies about welfare capitalism and paternalism continue to
proliferate.
For early general works see, for example,
David Brody, "The Rise and Decline of Welfare Capitalism,"
in John Braeman, et al .. Change and Continuity in Twentiethcentury America: The 1920s (Columbus, Ohio, 1968), 147-178.
For recent case studies, see, for example, Gerald Zahavi,
"Negotiated Loyalties: Welfare Capitalism and the
Shoeworkers of Endicott Johnson, 1920-1940," Journal of
American History 70 (1983), 602-620; Lizabeth Cohen, Making
a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago. 1919-1939.
(Cambridge, 1990) , 159-211. For a single company, see Peter
Iverson, "Welfare Capitalism at the Reo Motor Car Company,"
Michigan History 69 (November/December 1985), 37-44; Lisa M.
Fine, "'Our Big Happy Family': Masculinity and Paternalism
at the Reo Motor Car Company of Lansing, Michigan," Labor
History. 34 (Spring/Summer 1993), 274-291.
For welfare
capitalism and paternalism in the Southwest, see Meltzer,
ibid.. 12-34.
29. Fleming, ibid.. 28-45. Fleming culled most of his
information from Kinnear's memoir, Fifty Years in Mining
(Kennecott Copper Corporation private publication, 1967) ,

45
University of Nevada Las Vegas, Special Collections.
In
Fleming's rather hagiographical article, he describes
Kinnear as "a master craftsman in the gentle art of
motivating human beings," who ruled McGill with an "iron
fist and soft heart." Residents "worshipped" Kinnear for
his "sincere, unsolicited concern for his fellow beings."
Kinnear "earned the trust of the immigrant elements [sic]"
in the town, citing two oral interviews Greek residents.
This trust did not prevent Kinnear from personally firing a
second-generation Greek worker who requested a wage increase
when Kinnear asked for the man's opinion about work
conditions at the slag dump. At the time Kinnear was
general manager of the Nevada Mines Division. Oral
interview of John Skandros by the author, November 11, 1993.
Russell Elliott describes Kinnear a "benevolent dictator,"
but lauds Kinnear's "benevolent and far-sighted policies."
Fleming, ibid. 28; Elliott, ibid.. xi.
30. J. C. Kinnear, Jr., quoted in Fleming, Ibid.. 39.
31. In a survey of the district's Labor Day speeches from
the holiday's inception in 1903 through the 1940s, there is
not one mention of the workers desiring any benefit other
than decent wages, union recognition, and safety
legislation. After the Great Depression, workers looked not
to the company, but to the government for a solution to
their material problems. David M. Anderson, "Speeches and
Sports: Labor Day Celebrations in the Ely, Nevada Area,
1903-1949," paper given at the Sixth Annual Convention of
the Far West Popular Culture Conference, February 6, 1994.
32. Elliott, Growing U p in a Company Town. 37, 110, 112.
33. The literature on company towns in the West is scarce.
The only monograph is James B. Allen, The Company Town in
the American West (Norman, 1966). Allen defines a company town as "simply... any community which has been built wholly
to support the operations of a single company, in which all
homes, buildings and other real-estate property are owned by
that company, having been acquired or erected specifically
for the benefit of its employees, and in which the company
provides most public services." His brief definition is
"any community which is owned and controlled by a particular
company." 4-6. Readers should be warned that this book is
seriously flawed and I use it here because Allen, an
apologist for the company town, accepts the employers'
definition for the term "model." As I contend throughout
this study, the company town was devised to "benefit" the
copper companies.
Allen's book was the subject of one of the most
scathing book reviews in the American historical profession.
Calling it an "unmitigable disgrace," Herbert Gutman cited

46
the book's title as its "one redeeming quality," criticized
Allen's lack of critical sources or a comparative framework,
and quoted examples of faulty generalizations.
See Herbert
Gutman, Review of The Company Town in the American West
(James B. Allen), Labor History 9 (Spring 1968), 282-285.
34. Fine, ibid.. 276-7.
35. Ibid.. 274-291; Elliott, Nevada's Twentieth-Centurv
Minina Boom. 205-250; Elliott, Growing Up in a Company Town.
24-35.
36. "Seventh Biennial Report of the Commissioner of Labor,
1927-28, (Nevada)," Appendix to the Journals of the State
and Assembly.. (Carson City, 1929).
In 1928, there were
four AFL locals at the mill, including Mine Mill,
carpenters, plumbers, and electricians.
The Nevada Northern
railway workers and machinists in the railroad's East Ely
repair yard were also organized. Additionally, six AFL
locals were able to dictate wages and hours with some
success in the town of Ely. Excluding Mine Mill, most of
these locals were formed just before or during World War I,
when they were assured government protection.
37. O'Connor, ibid.. 323.
38. Lillie Barbour Clinedinst, Labor Day speech, Ely,
Nevada, September 6, 1926, quoted in the Elv Daily Times.
September 7, 1926; Charles S. Chandler, Labor Day speech,
McGill, Nevada, September 4, 1922, quoted in the White Pine
News. September 10, 1922.
39. C. E. Handwright, Labor Day speech, Ely, Nevada,
September 1, 1924, Elv Daily Times. September 2, 1924.
40. Elv Daily Times. September 4, 1920.

CHAPTER THREE
CHALLENGING HEGEMONY, 1930-1940

I.
Antonio Gramsci's theory of hegemony explains how a
ruling class gains consensus from subaltern groups, thereby
extending its domination throughout the whole of society
without the continual application of brute force.

He

defined hegemony as an "organizational and connective"
function of the superstructure emanating historically from a
society's specific economic base through the corresponding
social relations of production.

Refining Karl Marx's theory

of society, Gramsci posited a superstructure consisting of
two integrated levels.

The first level consists of

"political society," where the state and legal apparatus
exercise their familiar roles of force and legal coercion,
or what Gramsci labelled "direct domination" and "command."
The second level consists of "civil society," or the
"private" sector.

It is at this level where the ruling

class organizes hegemony, obtaining "spontaneous consent"
from the subordinate class.1
Hegemony is maintained through the dominant economic
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groups7 ability to "elaborate," or extend, its economic
domination into the political, cultural, and social realms
of the subordinate class.

A social class gains consent and

subsequent social cohesion through the use of intellectuals
serving as "deputies" to "direct...the ideals and
aspirations" of the dominant class.

Although Gramsci

posited a theory of the state, hegemony is also organized at
the local level.2
The character of company domination and the
construction of the informal equilibrium of industrial
relations in the Ely district shows a local application of
hegemony.

During the 1912 and 1919 strikes, Nevada

Consolidated demonstrated its ability to command the state7s
juridical and police apparatus to forcibly coerce compliance
with its rule.

During the mid-1920s, its policy of welfare

capitalism supplanted working-class institutions and quelled
agitation, thus gaining peaceful consent for its control.
"Hegemony," Eugene Genovese says, "implies class
antagonisms; but it also implies...the ability of a
particular class to contain those antagonisms on a terrain
in which its legitimacy is not dangerously questioned."3
After the 1919 strike, Ely-district workers discarded the
overt challenges to management prerogatives so evident in
the preceding two decades.

This decision was marked by the

rejection of inclusive industrial unionism and the
abandonment of any notion of an oppositional political
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culture.

The workers7 capitulation and deference to

capitalist prerogatives attest to the establishment of
company hegemony.

As a dynamic system of class domination,

hegemony also required compromises by both companies in
order to obtain consent from the district's workers.4
Nevada Consolidated recognized the limits of its
control.

It acknowledged the craftworkers7 notion of

masculinity by granting them a preferred status in the
community, keeping their wages high, providing good homes,
and allowing the formation of union locals without
retaliation.

The company also permitted the immigrant

workers to maintain "ethnic enclaves" without mandating
intrusive Americanization projects.5
Nevada Consolidated had successfully maneuvered through
a turbulent two decades of industrial relations to gain the
workers7 consent of their economic control by extending that
control further into the cultural sphere of the workingclass.

Nevada Consolidated7s system, described by Elliott

as "semi-feudal," required micromanagement of the local
labor market and interference into workers7 cultural
institutions that was not practiced at the Kimberly mines.
There, the company had opted for the advanced
capitalist notion of individualism and depersonalization.
The Kimberly miners, in turn, reacted to market forces
rather than directly challenging Consolidated Coppermines7
domination.

By the end of the 1920s, both companies had
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established hegemony in Ely district, mediated through the
informal equilibriums at the McGill and Kimberly.

II.
Once the prosperity of the 1920s ended, three
conditions converged to disrupt the Ely-district's informal
equilibrium.

None of these conditions can be seen as

sufficient to topple the existing system of industrial
relations, yet each signified the intrusion of external
forces that presented both the workers and the company an
opportunity to maintain the status quo or to opt for change.
These forces exposed the contradictions inherent in both
welfare and open-shop capitalism as they increasingly
conflicted with a federal labor policy that sanctioned
collective bargaining.
The first threat to the informal equilibrium was
upheaval in labor market conditions caused by the copper
industry's plummeting economic fortunes during the Great
Depression.

Welfare capitalism or reliance on market forces

were useless if they failed to provide for the workers'
material subsistence.

Economic insecurity during the 1930s

led workers to reject the district's existing systems of
class domination and move toward collective solutions
suggested by New Deal labor legislation.
A second necessary condition affecting the district's
industrial relations was government support for unionism,
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which stood in opposition to the existing social relations.
Government sanction was important because it allowed
unionized workers to simultaneously express citizenship and
class-consciousness.

Defining themselves as both members of

the working class and as American citizens, workers could
morally justify collective action when it was backed by the
government's imprimatur.
American institutions.

Unions were now seen as patriotic,
Workers rejected the hegemonic

notion that equated unionism with radicalism and began
expanding their locals once they perceived the state as an
ally that could successfully compel employers to
collectively bargain.
The final condition that could potentially upset the
district's informal equilibrium was the international
union's support of local organizational efforts.

To the Ely

workers this meant the assignment of an organizer to their
area.

The union organizer served the function of what

Gramsci termed the "organic intellectual,11 helping the
working-class realize itself as a distinct class by
providing an explicit critique of ruling-class domination
and by formulating a working-class alternative to the
received order.

The organizer also possessed the knowledge

to mount an effective campaign through a systematic,
educational process.6
The organizer's strategy held immediate and long-term
goals.

The organizer had to convince workers that
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unionization could successfully provide concrete economic
gains and more control of the job process.

This was

accomplished through an economic and moral critique of
existing institutions.

In addition to this activity, the

organizer as "organic intellectual" also fulfilled a
political function by performing the initial task of
mobilizing the working class against capitalist hegemony.7
The "outside" organizer was crucial in districts where
this type of intellectual did not emerge from the workers
themselves.

Although there were some rank-and-file leaders

in the Ely district, their enthusiasm was tempered by
company intransigence and fluctuated with changing economic
conditions.

In 1941, Mine-Mill belatedly began activity in

the Ely area as part of their larger strategy of organizing
the nation's copperworkers.

Until then, the Ely-area

workers were on their own.

III.
The carefully-constructed system of class domination in
the Ely district was predicated on a stable economic and
social environment.

Faced with increasing economic

insecurity after 1930, Ely-district workers responded to the
government's support of organized labor by reviving dormant
Mine-Mill locals at the smelter and mines.

Industrial

unionism at the smelter threatened the craft locals by
organizing workers on a company-wide basis.

Between 1933
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and 1938, Ely-area workers mounted three unsuccessful
attempts to replace the prevailing informal equilibrium with
formal collective bargaining agreements.

By 1940, however,

economic stability had returned to the district, industrial
unionism had been discarded, and company hegemony was again
acknowledged.
The Great Depression hit the Ely district in January
1930.

Tumbling copper prices forced Nevada Consolidated to

lay off nearly 400 employees, many of whom left the district
to look for job opportunities elsewhere.

The future was

equally bleak for those who remained, as conditions steadily
deteriorated for the next four years.

By October 1931 the

company had cut wages ten percent and the plant was
operating at only forty percent capacity.

The union locals

could not withstand the hard times that descended on the
district.

Down to just twenty-three members, Local 233

disbanded in November.8
Nevada Consolidated tried to soften the economic
hardship.

The company instituted "work-sharing" plans that

kept more workers on their payroll, extended credit to some
workers, and encouraged private charities to provide relief
to the unemployed.

However, the company simultaneously

continued to cut production and to reduce the size of its
labor force.

Workers and their families were devastated,

holding little hope for recovery until the summer of 1933.9
Franklin Roosevelt's election victory and the ensuing
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"Hundred Days" of New Deal reform legislation galvanized the
Ely district.

During the summer and fall of 1933, the NIRA

received widespread approval from both the district's
merchants and working class.

The NIRA's Section 7(a)

unleashed a spontaneous wave of union formation.

Ely-

district workers, like thousands across the country,
responded to the NIRA with patriotic fervor.

For the first

time, the federal government seemed to be firmly on labor's
side.10
Because the Depression had made it clear that the
companies could no longer guarantee economic security,
workers rekindled a militant spirit that recalled an earlier
era.

A speaker at the district's 1933 Labor Day celebration

declared that the NIRA represented the "principles that
Labor has fought for through years past."

Among these were

"a voice in industry, work for the jobless, and shorter
hours at a living wage."11
Ely-area workers believed that unionism would be an
integral part of Roosevelt's recovery plan.

"Proceeding

under the tenets of the NRA," workers at both the Ruth pit
and the McGill smelter renewed their Mine-Mill charters.
The Ruth miners organized Mine-Mill Local 124 with 383
members.

At McGill, the smelterworkers revived Local 233,

which rapidly swelled to 500 members within a few months.12
Although the AFL also organized several locals at the
smelter, the Mine-Mill locals' large membership figures
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indicate that most workers organized along industrial
lines.13

This resurgence was accompanied by mass

demonstrations of class consciousness held outside the
company's purview.

Both locals jointly planned a "huge"

Labor Day parade and the Ruth miners union announced its
first annual dance in October.14
Nevada Consolidated's initial response shows that it
interpreted this revival of unionism within the framework of
the informal equilibrium.

In August 1933 the company

announced a wage increase for all employees based on a
sliding scale that linked wages to the prevailing price of
copper.

Although there is no record that employees actually

received a raise, it provides an instructive example of the
company's strategy for containing unionism through economic
incentives.

Nevada Consolidated would repeat this tactic

several times over the next decade whenever union activity
increased.15
Despite the enthusiasm for the NIRA throughout the
district,

Nevada Consolidated refused to recognize the

Mine-Mill locals.

The company initially stalled collective

bargaining negotiations until completion of the copper
industry's National Recovery Administration production code.
The copper industry's code, an essential part of the
National Recovery Administration's plan to raise commodity
prices by allowing producers to voluntarily limit
production, would not be approved until April 1934.16

Even after the code went into effect, Nevada
Consolidated continued to delay collective bargaining
negotiations.

In November 1934, Henry J. Meyer, a

representative of Local 233, complained to the National
Labor Board, the ineffectual precursor to the NLRB, about
the company's refusal to sign an agreement.17

The company

apparently responded to these charges by dismissing Meyer,
who filed a discriminatory discharge claim in March 1935.18
Despite such intransigence, Mine-Mill locals at both the
company's mine and smelter remained active.
Ely-district unionism received another boost with the
passage of the Wagner Act and the subsequent rise of the
CIO.

Although enacted in July 1935, the full effect of the

law was not felt in the district until it was upheld by the
Supreme Court in April 1937.

Membership waxed and waned

from the spring of 1935 to the summer of 1936, averaging
about 350 members at the smelter and approximately 230 at
the Ruth mine.19
The CIO's growing power encouraged further unionism
throughout the district, commencing in the late summer of
193 6 and cresting in the fall of 1937.

Along with the

increased activity at McGill and Ruth, miners employed by
Consolidated Coppermines formed Kimberly Local 363 in June
1937, claiming 313 members by September.20

In the town of

Ely, workers in occupations traditionally excluded from AFL
craft representation also turned to the CIO, forming the
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White Pine Central Labor Union under Mine-Mill's
jurisdiction.21

So strong was the CIO in the district that

in July, 1937, Sam W. Wolfe, a CIO organizer speaking in
Boca, California, claimed that Ely copper miners were "100
per cent" CIO.

Although he slightly exaggerated the

district's CIO membership at that time, Mine-Mill membership
records indicate that out of approximately 1500 workers,
almost 800 McGill smelterworkers and 600 miners at Ruth and
Kimberly had paid their membership dues.22
Despite their impressive numerical strength, the Elydistrict Mine-Mill locals again failed to obtain a
collective bargaining agreement.

Carl Barber, the head of

Local 233's grievance committee, testified at a later NLRB
hearing that the company did informally recognize the union
during this period.

He recalled that between 1933 and 1938

"numerous grievances were adjusted" between management and
Mine-Mill officers at both the smelter and the mine.

In

1936, the locals submitted a collective bargaining agreement
for Nevada Consolidated's approval.

Although "some

discussion" followed, the company refused to negotiate and
ultimately rejected the proposed contract.23

Nevada

Consolidated continued to interpret worker demands as a
function of the informal equilibrium.

Instead of

recognizing the union, the company responded with a wage
increase and hinted that "the number of days of employment
each month...would be increased."24
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The climax of 1930s CIO unionism in the Ely district
came in the spring and summer of 1938.

That year, the

national split between the AFL and CIO reached Nevada.
Until this time, there appears to have been a bipartisan
spirit among the state's AFL and CIO unions.

In the Ely

area, the Mine-Mill locals had remained members of the AFL's
White Pine County Central Labor Council (WPCLC) and
continued to pay per capita dues to the state's AFL council.
The WPCLC recognized Mine-Mill's traditional industrial
jurisdiction at the smelter and mines, and craftworkers held
both Mine-Mill and craft membership cards.25

This local

harmony would be threatened by events at the state and
national level.
At the May 1938 Nevada State AFL convention, a
representative for AFL president William Green red-baited
Nevada CIO officers and rejected any notions of cooperation
between the two federations.

Gene Keefe, president of the

Nevada AFL, expressing regret over the controversy, blamed
the conflict on disagreements between international union
officers.

However, acting on Green's orders, the Nevada AFL

expelled the state's CIO unions.26
Anticipating the split, twenty-five delegates
representing the state's industrial unions met at Ely a day
before the AFL convention to discuss plans for a statewide
CIO council.

The meeting was also attended by Utah State

Senator E. M. Royle, secretary of Mine-Mill District 2 and

George Cole, "a personal representative" of Reid
Robinson.27

In June 1938, the first convention of the

CIO's Nevada Industrial Council (NIC) was held at the Ely
Labor Temple.

The NIC included delegates from CIO locals in

Las Vegas, Silver Peak, Pioche, and Goldfield as well as the
three Ely-district locals.

Indicative of the district's

statewide CIO leadership, all three of the council's elected
officers were from the Ely area.

Ignoring the national

dispute between the two federations, the council urged
cooperation with both the state's AFL craft unions and
independent railroad brotherhoods.28

Despite such

optimism, the CIO was already encountering employer
intransigence at the Kimberly mine.
The Kimberly miners were the first Ely-area local to
petition for an NLRB election.

In June 1937, miners had

formed Local 363, the first Mine-Mill local ever at the
Kimberly mines.

The local's initial organizational activity

appears to have been well coordinated.

At a special July

election to select the local's officers, free buses
transported the miners from Kimberly and Riepetown to the
Ely Labor Temple.29
Unlike their IWW predecessors, the Kimberly miners did
not profess radical goals.

Local 363 president L. L. Brown

announced that he wished "to build up an organization that
the citizens of White Pine county and J. B. Haffner, general
manager of the Consolidated Coppermines Corporation, would
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be proud of [sic]."

He urged harmony among the members and

"cooperat[ion] in making the union a true and patriotic
American organization."30

Despite Brown's sanguine

pronouncements, the local's membership rapidly declined
after this meeting.

This rapid shift from active unionism

to apathy indicates that the informal equilibrium still
existed at the mines.

However, by June 1938, as economic

conditions worsened, the Kimberly local rebounded.
In their first step toward possible NLRB certification,
Local 3 63 members successfully petitioned for an NLRB
election to determine if the local represented a majority of
the Kimberly miners.31

By this time, the union clearly

intended to establish formal collective bargaining as the
basis for its industrial relations with Consolidated
Coppermines.

A handbill circulated among the miners

proclaimed that Local 363 "stands for improved working
conditions and protection of the rights of all workers."
Reflecting a militancy that was nonexistent the year before,
the local's 1938 platform demanded a "fair day's pay for a
fair day's work," an eight-hour day, collar-to-collar,
holiday, and overtime pay, seniority rights, a five-day
grievance procedure, and "compensation for disability due to
industrial diseases."

It listed "negotiation, arbitration,

mediation, and legislation," as the means for attaining its
program.32
On the same day the NLRB election was announced, both
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companies posted notices suspending production for a minimum
of thirty days, beginning June 16 and eventually extending
until August 1.

The decision affected "at least 1000 men"

in the Ely district, although 200 would remain at Kimberly
and "several hundred" at McGill and Ruth to do "development
and repair work."

The companies insisted the layoff was due

to oversupply, "constantly shrinking business," and excess
production.33
Consolidated Coppermines soon reversed its position.
In the midst of the Kimberly miners' NLRB campaign,
Consolidated Coppermines announced that, unlike Nevada
Consolidated, it would not suspend operations. 34

Because

there is no record of the local's support prior to the
election, it is unclear whether the company's action had any
effect on the outcome.

What is certain is that Mine-Mill

apparently won the election by the slimmest of margins: one
vote.35

However, the NLRB, unable to determine the

validity of four disputed votes, never compelled
Consolidated Coppermines to recognize this victory.
In July 1938, Nevada Consolidated announced production
would resume at Ruth and McGill, and "at least 450 men"
would be rehired on a five-day week basis beginning August
l.36

This date marked prosperity's return as rising

production ended the first challenge to company hegemony.37
Conditions reverted back to the pre-Depression days.

At the

McGill smelter, a small group of craftworkers maintained a
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Mine-Mill local, while union organization severely declined
at both the Ruth and Kimberly mines.

The informal

equilibrium of the 1920s had returned.
After the Kimberly debacle, local officers believed
that successful organization could only be accomplished if
the international union assigned a full-time organizer to
the district.

While economic insecurity and government

support for unionism proved necessary preconditions fordestabilizing the informal equilibrium, an experienced
international union organizer would also be required to help
their locals establish formal industrial relations with both
companies.
In August 1938, at Mine-Mill's annual convention, the
delegates from Locals 233 and 363, joined by representatives
of Pioche, Nevada Local 407, submitted a resolution
imploring the union to aggressively organize their state's
mining and metals industry.

The resolution described

conditions throughout the state, and particularly in the Ely
district, where members were "having a hard struggle"
keeping their Mine-Mill locals active.38
Delegates listed several cases where employers had
opposed unionization.

Kimberly Local 363, whose NLRB case

had been pending "for some time," had encountered
"considerable trouble in obtaining recognition."

Although

Local 363 won their election by one vote, Consolidated
Coppermines "refused to grant...union recognition [or]
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to...negotiate."

Similarly, the workers at McGill 233 and

Ruth 124 had "no working agreements."39
The blame rested on the companies.

Although the

resolution did not specifically delineate their grievances,
the Nevada delegates charged that the
mining companies in White Pine County, Nevada are
responsible for a number of things that break up...
union organization, discourages [sic] the members,
[and] which have all been in violation of the Wagner
Act and the National Labor Relations Board.40
The solution had to come from the international union.
Although active members were "trying to hold the unions
together," they needed "an outsider with considerable
experience in the labor movement,...who has had experience
in negotiating contracts through the efforts of the Labor
Board" [emphasis mine] to assist Kimberly, Ruth, and McGill
locals.

This type of organizer could "really put the locals

in White Pine county, Nevada where they belong and [allow
them to] receive their just dues under the protection of
the" Wagner Act.

The delegates requested that George Cole

(who had attended the recent Nevada State CIO convention in
Ely) be assigned to White Pine County, "to bring the
organizations up and assist with the negotiations" pending
in Kimberly, and at other Nevada mines.
The international union did not respond to the Ely
delegates' plea.

Instead, the convention chairman referred

their resolution to the union's organization committee for
future consideration.41

Mine-Mill would not assign anyone
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to the Ely district until 1941, by which time the enthusiasm
of the 1930s had faded and workers were responding to new
developments in the area's industrial relations.
Three outcomes resulted from turmoil and activity of
the depression decade.

First, Mine-Mill locals had failed

to establish the primacy of industrial unionism over craft
unionism, thus allowing the AFL trade unions (which had been
devastated by the depression) to gain a foothold among the
craftworkers that they would exploit in the early 1940s.
Second, the miners at Kimberly, and to some extent Ruth,
became disillusioned with Mine-Mill because of the
international's failure to support their organizational
attempts.

The miners remained skeptical toward attempts to

revive their locals until 1943.

Finally, the informal

equilibrium of the 1920s returned as both companies
successfully resisted the workers' attempts to establish
formal collective bargaining.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE "POSSIBILITIES" OF ORGANIZATION,
JANUARY 1941-SEPTEMBER 1941

As defense-era demand revived the copper industry, the
informal equilibrium of the 1920s began to reappear.

This

was acutely evident in the waning unionism among the Elydistrict workers.

Between 1939 and 1941 the Mine-Mill

locals at the McGill smelter and Ruth mine steadily
declined, while Kimberly Local 363 disbanded in 1940.1
Beginning in the spring of 1941, the AFL began an offensive
that threatened to unsettle the status quo and to undermine
industrial unionism among the copperworkers.

Mine-Mill

leaders quarreled over the best approach to block the AFL
and to organize the Ely district along industrial lines.
This debate centered on the selection of an organizer.
It reveals internal fissures among the union leaders,
showing how District Board Member Ralph Rasmussen, who
desired to use his own rank-and-file organizers, opposed
President Robinson's use of left-wing outsiders.

Robinson's

compromise choice, L. G. Robison, satisfied neither party.
Although he conducted a brief and failed campaign, Robison's
techniques give some insight into the intellectual function
71
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of the labor organizer.

Nevertheless, by the fall of 1941,

the union had squandered an opportunity to organize the
district.
In the spring

of 1941, Nevada Consolidated signed its

first ever collective

bargaining agreement with the

company's train engineers and switchmen.

Occupying a

strategic place in the production process, these workers
operated the train crews that transported ore from the Ruth
and Kimberly mines

to the McGill smelter.

On March 27, 1941

the company agreed

to a contract covering wages, hours, and

working conditions with the independent Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers Local 593, the engineers' bargaining
agent.2

A week later, the AFL-affiliated Switchmen's Union

Local 267 concluded negotiations in Washington, D.C. with a
similar agreement.3

These two contracts marked a dramatic

transformation in the Ely district's industrial relations.
By finally breaching Nevada Consolidated's traditional
intransigence, the trainmen gave the district's other
workers hope that the company would bargain with the
remainder of its labor force.
In the wake of the trainmen's contract, Ely district
Mine-Mill officers and active members sent "urgent requests"
to District Two Board Member Ralph Rasmussen asking for an
organizer to help them capitalize on the new enthusiasm in
the district.4

Based in Utah, District Two included the

entire southwestern copper industry, encompassing the states
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of Nevada, Utah, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas.

In April,

Rasmussen submitted a report suggesting the Board consider
"putting someone on in the future" in the Ely district.5
Later that month, he toured the Ely district to investigate
the "possibilities" of organization.6
Rasmussen immediately noticed the AFL's aggressive
drive to obtain contracts for all the company's craft
workers.

He enviously described the AFL as the district's

"fair-haired boys," because the AFL-affiliated switchmen was
one of the two unions that had successfully coaxed Nevada
Consolidated to the bargaining table.7

The AFL boasted a

strength and appeal that the Mine-Mill locals could not yet
match.

At the smelter, Rasmussen found the AFL to be "well-

represented" among the electricians, boilermakers, and
especially the machinists, who he called "the best organized
of the crafts."8

Given its strength in these three elite

groups, the AFL initially considered approaching the company
as a single unit but soon discarded this tactic because it
lacked a majority of members among the other craftworkers.
The AFL decided instead to seek separate contracts for each
group, demanding a dollar per day wage increase.9
Nevada Consolidated adamantly opposed the AFL
offensive.

An AFL representative told Rasmussen that he had

asked the company for a "front door deal for the machinists"
but "had been turned down flat."

The company dubiously

insisted that "they preferred to deal with one union for all

their men" and vowed that "every certification would have to
be won the hard way"— by winning an NLRB election.10
Rasmussen laid a "50-50 bet" that Nevada Consolidated did
not want to negotiate with any of the craft groups,
regardless of the outcome of the elections.

However, the

company was vulnerable to the demands of the skilled
workers, who were being lured by the high wages being paid
on the West Coast.

Rasmussen speculated that the machinists

could prevail with their demands "due to the fact that the
company is losing all their good mechanics to the shipyards
and other defense projects."11
Rasmussen hoped that advantageous labor market
conditions would also benefit the Ely district's moribund
Mine-Mill locals. Despite their officers' enthusiasm, the
McGill and Ruth locals were comprised of only twenty members
apiece and were "for all practical purposes out of
existence.1,12

Following the failed attempts in the 1930s,

many smelterworkers had deserted the union, convinced that a
contract was "impossible since they were turned down on
their proposal some years ago."

Remaining members were,

according to Rasmussen, "willing and ready to go ahead now
and rebuild these unions," even though their locals had been
"dead for a long time."

Active Mine-Mill members wanted to

beat the AFL to the bargaining table, although some were
machinists who also belonged to the AFL craft union and
stood to gain either way.

The Mine-Mill machinists had been
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"double-heading" or holding cards in both unions, but they
favored industrial unionism and rejected the notion of
"separate contracts" for the AFL craft unions.13
For their part, local officers took measures designed
to encourage recruitment.

They agreed to reduce their

reinstatement fee to attract former members and also decided
to spend all the money in their coffers— $900 at Ruth and
$400 at McGill— on an organizing drive built around the
demands of a pay raise (although they had "comparatively
good wages"), seniority, a dues check-off, and a better
vacation clause.

Rasmussen noted that the cloud of

pessimism that had pervaded the Mine-Mill locals since the
late 1930s had lifted; the trainmen's contract had rekindled
extinguished aspirations of the past and finally
"stimulate[d] some life and some hopes for organization.1,14
Because of the contracts, however, Rasmussen was
cautious about immediately challenging the AFL.

The AFL had

"done a lot of work," he noted, while Mine-Mill was "in
somewhat of an unfavorable predicament."
AFL had several weaknesses.

Nevertheless, the

Its strength was concentrated

in only three of the six craft locals at the smelter and
therefore could not match Mine-Mill's potential appeal to a
broader base of workers.15 Additionally, the AFL was
suspicious of the NLRB and what it saw as the Board's proCIO bias.

Many AFL officers were therefore reluctant to

test their support against the CIO in a certification
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election.

Rasmussen was "surprised" at the AFL's "apparent

lack of confidence in the NLRB," particularly after the
Board had recently forced many notorious open-shop employers
to the bargaining table.

Rasmussen also counted on

craftworkers resenting the AFL's autocratic methods.
Although the AFL professed "'democracy'," and local
autonomy, the federation had "slapped [the switchmen's
union] with a $20.00 assessment fee before the ink was dry
on [their] charter."16
Local Mine-Mill officers believed they could exploit
these weaknesses, but only with the international union's
support.

Rasmussen noted that fatalistic members "who have

always hung crape [sic] on everything in the past, are
convinced that the job can be done with some help from"
Mine-Mill.

Rasmussen's own assessment of the situation was

cautiously optimistic.

Despite the AFL's initiative, there

was "no question" that Mine-Mill could "rebuild a very
important section of our jurisdiction ...[within a] short
period of time"; however, Mine-Mill had to move quickly to
prevent the AFL from signing separate contracts for the
craftworkers.

Mine-Mill had "by far the best chance" to

organize the area's workers along industrial lines, but if
they failed to act the AFL would split the copperworkers
into a "dozen, or more craft units."

Reflecting on the

change in worker and employer attitudes in the wake of the
trainmen's contract, Rasmussen mused that "someone is going
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to have this company under contract before long."17
Although Mine-Mill's Executive Board had targeted the
Ely district for organization, Robinson and Rasmussen
clashed over the selection of organizers.

This debate was

an important manifestation of a larger power struggle
between the two, who were also split on tactics concerning
an ongoing contract dispute with Utah Copper at this
time.18
Each man pursued a different agenda.

On one hand,

Robinson continued his organizational strategy, begun in the
late 193 0s, of using hand-picked, left-wing activists.

He

defended his choices by citing his successful record and
uncanny instinct for organizational activity.19

Rasmussen,

on the other hand, wanted District Board members to retain a
large measure of autonomy from the international.

His

strongest support was in the copper districts west of Salt
Lake City and into Nevada, and he tried repeatedly to fill
his district with rank-and-file organizers from that area.
He was, in effect, trying to accomplish on a regional level
what he accused Robinson of doing on a national level.
Throughout the next two years, this friction led to
compromise choices unsatisfactory to either Rasmussen or
Robinson and hampered efforts to successfully organize the
Ely district.
Calling the Ely district "too important to lose,"
Rasmussen requested that two organizers be assigned there

78
immediately.

He chose two members from District Two, one

from Utah and one from Nevada.20

Arguing that a successful

campaign would benefit the entire union, Rasmussen defended
the expense of two organizers: "we will never regret the
spending of money for organizational activity here at this
time."21
Ignoring Rasmussen's suggestions, Robinson appointed L.
G. Robison, a rank-and-file organizer from Rasmussen's
current Utah Copper campaign at Bingham Canyon.

Robinson

justified his decision to use only one organizer by claiming
that District Two was "loaded to capacity with organizers,"
and the union's dwindling finances made it "impossible" to
add another one.

Robinson also claimed that "past

experience" had shown that his opinions on "organizational
matters...have been substantially correct."22
Rasmussen angrily charged that countermanding a Board
Member's recommendation was "uncalled for and wholly out of
line with the proper functions of [the union president's]
good office."

He argued that, despite its ambitious plans,

the union was not yet completely committed to organizing the
important Western copper mines and smelters, where he
claimed "less than half...[were] receiving any attention."
The opportunity was at hand for launching a concerted
campaign to organize all Kennecott's properties.

The large

potential membership only justified hiring two organizers
because "they could pay their way with the new members they
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could bring into the organization."23
Rasmussen asserted that Robison, his "most important"
organizer, should not be removed from the Utah Copper
campaign.

The transfer would also be a personal hardship

for Robison, who had unexplained family problems.

Robison

was "the type of fellow who does not do justice to himself
or the cause unless Mrs. Robison is with him."

Robison's

removal provided fodder for a growing separatist movement
among Utah members opposed to Robinson.

Rasmussen warned

that if Mine-Mill did not act quickly and with a substantial
commitment, "we might as well make the A. F. of L. a present
of [the Ely district]."24
By the time Rasmussen voiced these objections, Robison
had already been sent to the Ely district.

On April 28,

Robinson ordered him "to start organizational work" and to
determine how "an immediate drive can be successful."25
During his brief tenure in the Ely district, Robison was
distracted by his desire to return to his family and to
resume work on the Utah Copper campaign.

Confessing that

Board Member Rasmussen was "somewhat exercised," Robinson
solicited Robison's own opinion about his transfer.26
Robison's poignant response reveals the daily
sacrifices made by union organizers.

They were paid low

wages, traveled long distances, constantly feared
harassment, intimidation, and violence, and, for those that
were married, experienced long periods of separation from
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their families.

For organizers who did not rise to an

administrative position, their career was a balancing act
between professional and personal concerns.

When they did

not organize an area, they carried this loss with them as a
personal failure.
Like many others who travelled to Nevada during the
early 1940s, Robison confronted a severe housing shortage
caused by the influx of defense workers.

He found the Ely

area to be "a very expensive place to live" with not "much
chance to find living quarters for a family."

A single room

at a "second rate hotel" was "very scarce and hard to get,"
and was expensive at $3.00 per day.27

Even after he

obtained more "satisfactory" living quarters, he longed for
his wife and children left behind in Utah.

Robison remarked

that he "would much rather have my family here than be
separated" and planned to get a larger "place to live" for
his family "as soon as the kids are out of school."28

When

asked by Robinson if he resented the transfer, Robison
replied that he was "more than [just] a little" disappointed
by the move.

Nevertheless, he passionately summed up his

commitment to the union:
I have always felt that it was my duty to the
organization to go where I was sent and to do the best
I could.... I shall to the best of my ability try to
[carry] on as best I can. My feeling has always been
that we must learn to subordinate self to the common
good if we are to be of value to the organization. We
must all realize that the working force of the
International must be directed [by the union's
officers] and even though it is sometimes
inconvenient for us, we must make the best of the
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situation... .29
Robison yearned to return to work on the "very important"
Utah Copper campaign, but he agreed that the Ely district
was equally vital to the union and that his leaving Utah
would "not...hurt the situation there."
Robison remained in the Ely area for only twenty-four
days.30

However, during his brief stay he managed to

provide an extensive analysis of the district that showed
the rising presence of the AFL and subsequent reformation of
the informal equilibrium.

While he grappled with the unique

character of Ely-district industrial relations, Robison's
tactics also reveal the intellectual function of the union
organizer.
Robison echoed Rasmussen's contention that the AFL was
experiencing a period of rising aspirations.

Robison found

that many workers saw no distinction between craft-based and
industrial unionism.

He commented that most of the workers

"seem[ed] to think the crafts are OK," including "quite a
few" Mine-Mill members.

Robison advised "not interfer[ing]

with the crafts," but believed a slow, wise campaign could
organize the workers "without trouble."

He predicted that a

"letdown" would occur once the AFL failed to secure a
contract with Nevada Consolidated.

Then the workers could

"be shown the absolute necessity of organizing industrially
if they are to better conditions."31
Robison's correspondence indicates that informal

equilibrium had indeed returned.

The McGill smelterworkers

maintained a small core of active union members, while the
Kimberly miners discarded any semblance of unionism.
Similarly, the companies resorted to their old tactics.
Nevada Consolidated attracted the stable smelterworkers'
loyalty with paternalistic welfare capitalism, while
Consolidated Coppermines confronted the more transient
miners with antiunionism.

If spontaneous unionism occurred,

it would not be among the smelterworkers, but among the
miners, a fact that Robison failed to grasp.

In what would

become a key point of disagreement over tactics, Reid
Robinson, who sensed the unique situation in the Ely
district, advised Robison to first concentrate on the miners
because they would "be easier to organize...than the
smeltermen," and that "success" there would spread to
McGill.32
Robison, however, did not recognize the dynamics of
industrial relations in the Ely district.

He believed that

Mine-Mill should "try to encourage the group that is working
at McGill and give them what assistance is possible."
During open meetings, the workers at McGill "seemed very
receptive" to Robison's message.

Besides a core of active

members, there were "some pretty live union men" that
Robison believed "should come along."

One glaring weakness

for organizing the plant industrially was clearly evident.
At the meetings, Robison observed the "complete absence" of
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foreign-born workers, who made up "quite a large number" of
the smelter's laborers and semiskilled industrial
workforce.33

Despite this intraclass division, he

nonetheless recommended that organization begin at McGill.
His conclusion ignored Robinson's suggestion that
initial organization should center on Ruth and Kimberly,
where conditions at the mines contrasted sharply with the
smelter town.

Robison found there was little AFL presence

at the mines— they had "nothing" at Kimberly and "very
little" at Ruth.

But the miners were not necessarily

hospitable to the CIO either.

Mine-Mill had "the past to

overcome" at the mines because of its lack of support during
the late 1930s.34
Robison found "rotten" conditions at Kimberly.

Above

ground, living costs were high and living conditions "very
bad."

Underground, the mines were unventilated, the company

used the speedup and the illegal one-man system, and the
accident rate was "terrible."

A legacy of union corruption

and a highly mobile work force were Robison's chief
obstacles at the mines.

When the Kimberly local had been

declared defunct in 1940, there apparently had been a
"financial scandal" which further discredited the union.
There were quite a number of union men in Kimberly, but
these were transients who, because conditions were "so bad,"
only "stay[ed] long enough for a road stake," shuttling
between Nevada and Climax, Colorado.

This unsettled
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environment was made worse by the presence of antiunion
foremen and workers.

He observed "quite a gang of finks"

employed at the Kimberly mines, including some "head
finks,"— foremen "who made themselves infamous by their...
activity in Silverton, Colorado."35
Despite "plenty of dissatisfaction because of
conditions," wages were "as high or higher than surrounding
camps."

Wages throughout the district had improved since

the trainmen signed their contracts, as part of the
companies' two-pronged strategy to defuse growing unionism.
"Evidently" aware of "considerable union sentiment in the
district," both companies granted a twenty-five cent wage
increase on May 1.

Although the wage increase was a typical

Nevada Consolidated response, Consolidated Coppermines went
one step further in making known its displeasure with
increased union activity, briefly laying-off about sixty
miners when it cut thirty minutes off the workday at
Kimberly.

The ostensible reason for this move was the

company's belated recognition of the three-year-old federal
Wage and Hour Law which mandated a shorter workday.
However, the antiunion message was clear when they hired
these workers back a few days later.
Robison aptly described the district's two systems of
industrial relations.

Nevada Consolidated used "the old

paternalism more," he noted, "with pretty good effect,"
while Consolidated Coppermines had "a decided antiunion
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complex" and would "prob[ably] fight [Mine-Mill] every inch
of the way."

Both the wage increase and the layoff "cooled

the boys off there for a time," slowing union activity for
several weeks.36
Robison
mass meeting

launched the Ely organizational drive with a
in McGill on

April 30, his first night in the

district, and continued to hold these gatherings throughout
his stay.

He then began establishing a network of contacts

to better assist him with an educational campaign.

Two

weeks after his arrival, he wrote to the international union
requesting a

list of workers who had written "urgent

requests" to

Rasmussen in

April.

Meanwhile,he started

circulating among the "right people"— those employees and
other Ely-area residents sympathetic to Mine-Mill's brand of
unionism.

At the old Wobbly stronghold of Riepetown, he

found a supporter in Mrs. Corak, who operated the Miners
Club, "a combination boarding house and saloon," and
presumably a haven for conferences to learn the local
gossip.

Before leaving, he planned to distribute the CIO

News, using the McGill and Ruth officers to help out at
their respective sites, while trying to get enough men to
"cover the different shifts" at the Kimberly mine.37
Robison's attitude mirrored Rasmussen's when assessing
the union's chances in the area.

In the middle of his

campaign, he saw a "grand opportunity" for Mine-Mill to make
"some real progress," but later learned of four internal
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weaknesses within the locals that made organizing the
district difficult.38

First, rank-and-file workers

resented that fact that officers had used the locals as
"political stepping stones."

For example, R. N. Gibson,

Nevada's Labor Commissioner, began his political career as a
Mine-Mill officer in Local 124.

Second, there were a

"number of old feuds" among the remaining members.

Robison

recommended that any organizer who came to the area "listen
much and talk little on some of these pet peeves."

Third,

many long-time members characterized any Mine-Mill
representative as "either a drunkard[,] a thief[,] or a son
of a bitch of some kind."

Robison noted that the district

was "no pleasant place" for an organizer until a turnover in
labor force brought "new blood" into the district.

Finally,

because of the combination of these conditions the locals
had "stagnated," with little interest left outside a core of
active members.

Nevertheless, Robison predicted that the

situation "will correct itself if new membership can be
brought in and some activity stirred up."39
Robison also stressed the statewide significance of the
Ely-district copper industry.

Nevada Consolidated's

treatment of its workforce was carefully observed by miners
everywhere, who Robison claimed "badly needed" organization.
In some of the state's other mining towns, "things [were] in
bad shape"— workers received low wages ($4.25 per day),
companies ignored overtime provisions, and used antiunion
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tactics "unknown in organized districts."

Organizing Nevada

Consolidated was, as Robison concluded, "the key to entire
state of Nevada."40
Robison would not witness any changes in the Ely
district.

On May 24, Reid Robinson ordered him to return to

the Bingham Copper campaign.41

Whether this move was

simply the result of Robison's dissatisfaction, Robinson's
frustration that he was not getting the best work out of the
organizer, or Rasmussen's constant pressure is unknown.
Despite Robison's departure, neither Robinson nor Rasmussen
intended to neglect the Ely district.

They clashed once

more over the selection of the most suitable organizer for
the district.
Again claiming to have received "many urgent pleas"
from the Ely district, Rasmussen submitted another roster of
Utah and Nevada rank-and-file organizers.

He warned that if

an organizer was not immediately sent to the Ely district,
the "recent program will die out for want of aid."

This

would not only destroy the members' morale, it would be
"another broken promise...chalked up against the
International."

And, he cautioned, Mine-Mill was "not good

for many more of them" in the Ely district.42
Reid Robinson also wanted to place the organizer of his
choice in the Ely district.

Less than a week after

Robison's transfer, Howard Goddard, Robinson's
organizational assistant, indicated that the union was
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planning to assign another organizer to Ely district and
asked Robison for a "complete report on the status of
organization,11 including "all contacts [and] activities."43
Ignoring Rasmussen, Robinson began his own search for a
replacement and by this time had apparently decided to
select someone outside of Rasmussen's District Two
stronghold.

In June, he remarked that he was "still

searching for a competent organizer for Nevada" and would
"try to get one in there as quickly as possible."44
Throughout the summer, Rasmussen continued to prod
Robinson.

In a report to the Executive Board, Rasmussen

noted that the Ely-district locals were in "serious
condition" because of "lack of help."

Although the members'

"numerous requests" had been relayed to Robinson, "to date,
nothing has been done toward rebuilding" their locals, which
were "situated in a very important section" of the copper
industry.

Rasmussen optimistically believed that a

"constructive ...program" could easily organize all the
employees at the McGill smelter "within a reasonable length
of time."

Rasmussen appealed to Robinson for "immediate

...help" in the Ely district.45
At the same time, Local 233 officers were lobbying the
international union to send another organizer before the
workers' enthusiasm completely dissipated.

In May, Local

233 financial secretary E. H. Hakenson urged starting
another campaign with dedicated, "live wire" organizers.
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Goddard assured him that the union was "making every effort
to secure" the type of organizer Hakenson requested, but
they were in short supply.

Increased organizational

activity throughout the "entire CIO" had "developed to such
an extent" that it was "very difficult to obtain competent
organizers on the spur of the moment."

Goddard confided

that he had several people in mind and would, in time, make
the necessary arrangements to place one in White Pine
County.46
Hakenson, who was one of the "double-heading"
machinists, reported that "several brothers stressed the
urgent need for speed" in sending an organizer because of
the AFL "activities."

He was particularly distressed that

the rival federation's progress had occurred while MineMill 's international leaders debated over the selection of
an organizer.

By mid-June, the AFL was on the verge of

filing a petition for an NLRB certification election.

The

craft locals had been "rapidly" expanding by utilizing CIO
tactics.

Hakenson noted that the AFL was "taking in

employees engaged in repair work whom formerly they wouldn't
consider."

Mine-Mill members in the skilled trades were

also being pressed to shift to AFL. "47
Hakenson cited a vast pool of workers— "between three
hundred fifty and four hundred men under thirty five years
of age"— that the union needed to actively recruit because
"a great many...[had] never belonged to a labor union."
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Hakenson advised that July would be a good time to send an
organizer when the local was "shifting in the [new]
officers," and there would be "three or four members who can
and will render splendid service."

He claimed all they

needed was "someone to 'spark' and to direct our organizing
activities. "48
Throughout the summer of 1941, the union failed to
respond to Hakenson's entreaties.

At Mine-Mill's annual

convention in August, Robinson promised the Ely delegation
that there would be an organizer in their district within
thirty days.

However, Robinson's vow came too late to stop

the AFL offensive.

That same month, the machinists at both

McGill and Ruth and the Ruth electricians filed petitions
for NLRB certification elections.49
Rasmussen continued to debate the organizer question
with Robinson.

In September, Rasmussen complained that an

organizer had not yet been appointed to the area and
suggested four potential candidates, again drawn from the
Nevada-Utah rank and file.50

By this time, Robinson had

finally selected George Haskell, a former Teamster organizer
from California, who had been recommended by Maurice Travis,
a Mine-Mill international representative based in Martinez,
California.51
Robinson's and Travis' joint opposition to Rasmussen's
candidates is crucial to understanding the internal dynamics
within Mine-Mill at this time, as well as explaining the
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type of organizer that Robinson preferred.

They viewed

Rasmussen's recommendations as provincial and unwilling to
make the sacrifices that the job required, sacrifices, that
even conservative CIO president John L. Lewis knew left-wing
organizers gladly accepted.

Despite his professed

commitment to the union, Robison's case of homesickness
underscores this point.52
The supply of dedicated organizers was a finite
quantity.

If Robinson rejected Rasmussen's selections out

of hand, then he had to find substitutes, preferably leftist
organizers that agreed with his progressive vision of the
union's future.

By the 1940s, the West Coast had developed

a strong contingent of left-wing labor activists.

In an

environment that contained Harry Bridges, the doyen of
American left-wing unionism, such organizers flourished— and
Robinson wanted them.

Getting them approved by a Board that

preferred organizers drawn from their own membership was
another matter.53
Robinson submitted Haskell's name to the Executive
Board in late August.

By the end of September, the divided

Board had yet to decide on his appointment.54

Trying to

rally support for Haskell, Paul E. Burns, a business agent
for Mine-Mill Local 50 in San Francisco, strongly
recommended him for the post.

Possibly prompted by Travis,

Burns praised Haskell's earlier work for the Teamsters in
Los Angeles, and testified that he was Local 50's "most
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capable organizer" who was "100% in any situation.1,55
In September Goddard informed Hakenson about Haskell's
appointment.

Goddard explained that until the Board

approved or rejected Haskell, it would "be a practical
impossibility to assign anyone" to the Ely area and again
noted there was "acute shortage of organizers throughout the
International Union."56
On September 27, Haskell was belatedly approved by the
Executive Board.

Informing Hakenson of the good news,

Goddard reminded him to give Haskell "all possible
assistance in familiarizing him with the local situation and
acquainting him with the membership," and recommended that
the two combine on a "program of organization" for the Ely
district.57
way.

The "live wire" organizer was finally on the
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CHAPTER FIVE
"SUCH CONTENTED WORKERS," OCTOBER 1941-DECEMBER 1942

Arriving in McGill, Nevada, on October 2, 1941, MineMill organizer George Haskell guickly noticed a phenomenon
he would encounter throughout his five-month organizational
campaign: "Never in my life," Haskell wrote after that first
day, "have I seen such a contented bunch of workers."1
Within two years, these same workers would be members of one
of America's most progressive unions.
Haskell recognized the outward manifestation of the
informal equilibrium at McGill that acknowledged company
hegemony.

The smelterworkers maintained a small union

local, while the miners eschewed unionism and used
geographical mobility to register displeasure with their
deplorable conditions.

The only difference from the 1920s

was the growing presence of the AFL craft unions.

Haskell

promoted industrial unionism as a means of unraveling Nevada
Consolidated's system of class domination.

Although

Haskell's campaign failed, it illustrates the organizer's
function as an "organic intellectual," by encouraging the
formation of a collective opposition to company hegemony.
In September 1941, Robinson's assistant, Howard
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Goddard, officially appointed Haskell, then living in San
Francisco, as an international organizer for the Ely
district.2

Goddard, aware of Robison's earlier warnings,

advised Haskell to "spend the first week or so...getting
acquainted with the local people."3 Arriving in the Ely
district on October 2, Haskell ignored Goddard's
recommendation to proceed cautiously and immediately called
a meeting of the members of Local 233 to familiarize himself
with what he called the workers' "organizing problem."
Despite the apparent lack of militancy, Haskell echoed
Robison's belief that the potential for mass organization
existed among the McGill smelterworkers.4
While it was clear to Haskell that working conditions
at the smelter were "very good," the company appeared
vulnerable to unionism.

The workers desired a contract, a

dues check-off, and a revision of the existing vacation
policy of five days off after six years employment— demands
Nevada Consolidated traditionally refused to negotiate.
Haskell settled on these three issues— contract, check-off,
and vacation— as his "talking points toward organizing"
others at the smelter.
Haskell favored directly criticizing Nevada
Consolidated to raise the workers' consciousness.

The

active McGill Mine-Mill members, however, disapproved of
this strategy.

They remembered the international's failure

to support them in the past and were wary of provoking a
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confrontation with the company.

Now that prosperity had

returned to the copper industry, most members preferred
instead to mediate their grievances through the informal
equilibrium.

The day Haskell arrived, cautious members

warned him that if he "had any intention of saying anything
against the management, or the company,

[he] had better pack

up and go back where [he] came from."5
Forbidden from criticizing Nevada Consolidated and thus
unraveling its welfare capitalist hegemony, Haskell opted
for an approach he termed "diplomatic organizing," which
required a time-consuming educational campaign.

For

example, he showed Mine-Mill-negotiated contracts and other
literature on industrial unionism to the "new workers" who
"have no idea at all what unionism is."

He also utilized

standard tactics: distributing copies of the CIO News at the
plant's entrance, canvassing workers' homes, and holding
frequent meetings.

Haskell decided to continue

organizational activity in McGill where, despite his
reservations, there was "a lot more enthusiasm towards
organizing" than either Ruth or Kimberly.6
Although the two mining towns were "the ones that
really need[ed] organizing the most," severe obstacles
existed at both sites.

Haskell found such terrible

conditions and antiunionism at Kimberly that he termed it
nothing more than a "transient camp."

The miners "stay long

enough to get a stake and then pull out as soon as they get
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it, if they are able."

Haskell received a cool reception,

remarking that "[a]11 the men act as though they are afraid
to be seen talking to an organizer."7
Attitudes toward the union were no better at Ruth,
where there was "little interest left" in Local 124.

Only a

handful of members were willing to assist in reorganization
despite a "standing offer" of fifty cents paid any member
who enrolled a new recruit (Haskell noted that "so far no
one has earned that offer").

The Ruth miners told Haskell

that "the international let them down last time they started
a drive by taking the organizer out just when they had
started to accomplish something."

They promised to remain

uncommitted until Mine-Mill assigned a full-time organizer
"to finish what he starts."

Haskell hoped that if the Ruth

and Kimberly miners saw the results at McGill "they in turn
will fall right in line."8
Remarkably, Haskell seemed on the verge of a
breakthrough by the end of his first month in the area.

On

October 29, he invited the district's workers to an open
meeting to discuss "contracts, vacation, seniority, checkoff
and job security."9

Haskell was initially disappointed

because only 108 men had attended, until members informed
him that it was a "pretty big gathering for this area."
Featuring speeches by several Utah CIO officers, including
Rasmussen, the meeting surpassed even their limited
expectations.

Indicative of the local's apparent progress,
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six new members joined that night.10
mark a turning point, however.

This meeting did not

Instead, it would be

Haskell's last successful venture in the Ely district.
The initial setback occurred at the end of October when
Haskell first learned of the coming NLRB hearings on the
petitions submitted by the Ruth International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers (IBEW) and International Association of
Machinists (IAM), which represented both the mine and
smelter.

The Board informed the startled Haskell that

hearings would be held in early November.

Haskell found the

IAM's petition particularly alarming because Local 233's
president and financial secretary were both machinists.

He

secured a delay until December 9 and set about gathering
witnesses to block the certification elections.11 At the
hearings, the NLRB denied Mine-Mill's claim that the plant
should be organized as an industrial union.

The Board also

rejected the IBEW's petition, but approved the IAM's request
for a certification election.12
Just prior to the NLRB hearings the United States
entered World War II, creating novel conditions that
thwarted Mine-Mill's campaign for more than a year.

The

coming of the war heightened community loyalty toward Nevada
Consolidated.

This is understandable given the anxiety that

prevailed immediately after Pearl Harbor.

Seeking security,

workers and their families retreated further into Nevada
Consolidated's paternalism to cope with the initial
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pressures generated by the war's outbreak.13
The citizens of White Pine County responded to pleas
for increased production and civilian mobilization with an
intense fervor.

The area's Mine-Mill locals would not be

revitalized until the crisis finally abated in January 1943.
Using its familiar power to interpret the meaning of war
production and to effectively mobilize the entire
population, Nevada Consolidated dampened unionism by sheer
domination of the economic and social life of the Ely
district, especially at McGill.
Even before the full impact of the war was realized,
the Pearl Harbor attack unleashed a wave of anti-Japanese
hysteria and prompted an intensive civilian defense program.
Nevada historian Russell Elliott, a McGill native, recalled
the "tense" atmosphere in his hometown immediately following
the outbreak of the war.

By December 11, following a

petition by the Ruth miners, more than one hundred of the
district's Japanese workers were placed under house arrest
with the full approval of Nevada Consolidated's management.
Elliott claims the primary cause of the hysteria was fear of
sabotage because of copper's importance as a strategic
metal.

However, festering racism, exacerbated by the

company's segregationist housing policies, also contributed
to the wave of paranoia that swept the area.14
Both Haskell's reaction and Mine-Mill's official
response to the arrest and subsequent removal of eighty to

one hundred Japanese nationals, reveal their attitudes
concerning the treatment of foreign-born workers during
World War II.

While the evidence is unclear, Haskell

apparently defended the civil rights of the Ely-area
Japanese workers after the bombing of Pearl Harbor.
His efforts were not completely sanctioned by Mine-Mill.
Allen McNeil, who had replaced Howard Goddard as Reid
Robinson's assistant, admonished Haskell for not being
"sufficiently tactful," although McNeil was "sure [that
Haskell was] perfectly right in what [he] did in regard to
protecting the Japanese workers at McGill."15

Haskell's

defense of the Japanese workers may have alienated him from
Local 233's rank and file, who later backed Nevada Governor
E. P. Carville's opposition to a proposed 1943 plan to
import Japanese workers into the state to relieve a chronic
labor shortage.16
Despite its role in the internment of Japanese workers,
Nevada Consolidated otherwise responded more constructively
to the war's outbreak by establishing a comprehensive
community defense plan.

Immediately after Pearl Harbor, the

company organized several defense committees, including an
"anti-sabotage" council.

The Red Cross began classes on

first aid, and the company allowed "about 35 men per day" to
donate blood.

Haskell witnessed the complete mobilization

of the town's population, noting that "[e]very man and woman
in McGill and Ruth have registered with the Civil Defense,
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and have all been assigned to jobs[,] such as warden,
firemen, etc."

Female stenographers and clerical workers

donated their services, and the Boy Scouts collected
"newspapers, pots, pans, and everything that is of need."17
Nevada Consolidated thus effectively nullified one of MineMill 's trump cards: linking unionism to full production.
Mine-Mill's wartime organizing strategy— termed the
"productionist ethic"— urged workers to join unions because
organized labor was best suited to guarantee uninterrupted
production during the war.18 Mine-Mill hoped to link full
production, patriotism, and unionism through the following
circular argument:

"[I]n order to get the best kind of

production, we have to be well organized,...because only
organized workers can really get the best advantage out of
producing."

Antiunionists were therefore "enemies of our

country" because "those who sabotage the union campaign
...are also sabotaging the production campaign of the
company, and are consequently not doing the best they can
for their nation in these critical times."

McNeil urged

Haskell to make "judicious use" of this argument to recruit
the McGill workers.19
Establishing a "management-labor" council to oversee
production soon after the war's outbreak, Nevada
Consolidated warded off criticism that they omitted labor's
voice from their wartime production plans.

Satisfied that

their employer was promoting all-out production, the Ely-
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area workers instead saw unionism as unpatriotic and
antithetical to the war effort.

They wanted to cease

organizational activity, because "in so doing we are not
cooperating with the government."

Nevada Consolidated

rewarded this sentiment with their typical response— a
timely twenty-five-cent wage increase,— "which," the hapless
Haskell moaned, "only makes matters a little more
complicated. "20
Prior to December 7, Haskell still believed the workers
were slowly being drawn into the union.

By January,

however, their attitude changed to hostile rejection.

Early

in the campaign, he easily distributed 500 copies of the CIO
News; by mid-December, only 100 workers accepted the free
newspaper.

Haskell noted that "some of the men take a copy

and throw it [on] the ground, others give me a growl."

When

canvassing door-to-door, he was invited into only "5 or 10"
of the town's 500 homes.

The workers "claim they are either

too busy or they don't want to have anything to do with the
CIO."

The open meetings, which originally "had a fairly

good turnout, had "gradually dwindled down to nothing but
members," and even they, Haskell starkly observed, "have
given up."

He still thought organization was possible if

the members "would only plug for me on the inside... but
they won't do it."

Haskell was so isolated that he was

forced to hire a Boy Scout to distribute union literature
because the members refused to help.21
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Declaring he had "used diplomacy long enough,"

Haskell

started a leaflet campaign aimed against Nevada
Consolidated, which, he warned McNeil, "may not be mild."
Haskell requested that McNeil dig up "any dirt on Nevada
Consolidated that they are dishing out anywhere in the
country" to use in his handbills.22 McNeil cautioned
Haskell to only give the workers "some of the facts" about
Nevada Consolidated "without entering into a full-fledged
attack on them."23

With the informal equilibrium firmly

entrenched, these aggressive tactics proved even less
effective than Haskell's earlier "diplomatic" approach.
Before leaving the district, Haskell admitted the
benefits workers derived from Nevada Consolidated's welfare
capitalism had stalled the drive.

He tried several

approaches but he could never find the right message or
tactics to persuade a significant number of workers to join
the union.

Haskell asserted that "to an outsider" the

benefits of welfare capitalism "are just a coverup for the
things they haven't got"— a contract, vacation, seniority,
and union recognition:

"It can be plainly seen from the

sidelines, but is not believed by the workers, even our
members can't be convinced of the fact."

Haskell "pounded

away continually" on these issues, but without results.24
After reviewing Haskell's dismal reports, McNeil
concluded that Mine-Mill was "wasting a good deal of time in
McGill."

Contrasting Haskell's lack of progress to Mine-
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Mill's "rather successful" negotiations with Nevada
Consolidated at their Santa Rita, New Mexico operations,
McNeil wondered "what the devil is wrong with these people
around McGill in our own union."

On February 6, he

recommended Haskell's transfer to the Miami-Globe region in
Arizona.25

The dejected Haskell accepted the move where,

he hoped, "some good can be done."26
In the ten months following Haskell's transfer, Local
233's membership dwindled to twelve active members and the
local failed to attract a single recruit for an entire
year.27 Not until January 1943 did this trend dramatically
reverse.

In the interim, unionism throughout the district

declined.
Both Robinson and Rasmussen agreed that Mine-Mill
should continue organizational activity.

In late February

1942, Robinson received Executive Board approval to hire two
organizers for Nevada, "who would be mutually agreed upon
between" him and Rasmussen.28 Although it initially
appeared that they would quickly assign another organizer to
replace Haskell, once again this decision was delayed.
In the meantime, activity among the locals
deteriorated.

Other national unions were aware of Mine-

Mill's declining presence.

In March, District 50, the

United Mine Worker's catchall industrial union, apparently
considered organizing the Ely copperworkers.

McNeil

informed Rasmussen of rumors about a man named "Mitchell,
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from District 50 from the Coast," who "expects to go into
McGill" and try "to swing some of our boys his way."

McNeil

urged Rasmussen to "put a stop to any such development
before it gets underway."29 Mine-Mill also had to contend
with both companies, who again trotted out traditional and
timely tactics to suppress unionism.

In June 1942, Nevada

Consolidated and Consolidated Coppermines announced "double
increases" of fifty cents per day for all day wage earners,
that reports claimed "raised the [district's pay] scale
considerably.1,30
Everything seemed to be coming apart for Mine-Mill in
the Ely district.

In a September memorandum to Robinson,

McNeil wrote that "indications [for] organizational
possibilities exist," but advised against a campaign because
of "lack of funds and personnel."

McNeil's views on the Ely

district paralleled his assessment of the entire District
Two, where the locals were "lagging" and there was a
"serious need for stabilization."

Because of numerous

problems— including "obtaining maximum dues payments"— he
counselled that it would be "unwise" for the union to begin
new organizational activity.31
By the beginning of 1943, Local 233 even began debating
whether to withdraw from the international union.

On

January 9, Hakenson wrote McNeil requesting that the
international union send a representative to their January
13 meeting, when the smelterworkers would consider a motion

to leave Mine-Mill.32

Robinson ordered Glen Freeman, an

organizer in the Utah Copper campaign who had briefly spent
some time in Ely a year earlier, to attend the meeting and
oppose the motion.33

The smelterworkers may have been

merely trying to attract an organizer into the district,
where unionism was reviving at the Kimberly mines.

There is

no record of a vote on the motion and Local 233 remained in
the union; nevertheless, its message was clear; unless the
international union supported the local there was no
guarantee it would remain affiliated with Mine-Mill.
activity at Kimberly soon reversed this sentiment.

The
Over the

next seven months, Mine-Mill began a torrid campaign to
organize the Ely-district copperworkers.
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CHAPTER SIX
"TWO-BIT RAISES" AND FORMAL EQUILIBRIUM,
JANUARY 1943-SEPTEMBER 1943

By the beginning of 1943, conditions in the Ely
district again seemed favorable for union organization.
First, Mine-Mill assigned a seasoned organizer who devised a
strategy that successfully attracted support away from the
AFL.
side.

Second, the federal government was on the union's
The NLRB helped the Kimberly miners complete a rapid

and spontaneous organizational campaign by blocking a
potential AFL counteroffensive.

Finally, unstable labor

market conditions that led to worker discontent underpinned
the upsurge in union activity.

By September 1943, Mine-

Mill-affiliated locals served as the bargaining agent for
all the Kimberly miners and for most of the workers at Ruth
and McGill.
A primary cause of this transformation was a change in
the Ely-area workforce, exacerbated by an "acute" labor
shortage in the copper industry beginning in the summer of
1942.

The military's "insatiable demand" for copper, the

drafting of young male workers, and the appeal of higherpaying West Coast defense production jobs forced Nevada
116
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Consolidated and Consolidated Coppermines to hire new
workers from outside the district to maintain full
production.

Fluidity in the labor market led to the

increased presence of employees who held no previous loyalty
towards Nevada Consolidated.
At Kimberly, government sanctions prevented the miners
from leaving the area, cutting off their usual method of
registering discontent.1 The clearest indication of worker
resistance was increased absenteeism.2

Chafing at rising

living costs and "frozen" into their jobs by government
order, the Ely-district copperworkers sought to remedy
increasing wartime constrictions through unionization.
Not surprisingly, the impetus for the successful 1943
drive came from the miners themselves.

Keith Norton, an

active Mine-Mill member at Kimberly, helped spur the sudden
burst of unionism.

On January 15 he wrote Reid Robinson

requesting a charter for the burgeoning Kimberly local.
Norton had attracted 177 initiates in just three days and
promised 400 more within a short time.

Confident that the

entire camp of 855 workers would join the union, he wanted
Mine-Mill to send "the best [organizer]... available."3
Even before an organizer arrived, the newly-christened
Kimberly Local 642 had successfully petitioned for an NLRB
election.4

Robinson later singled out Norton for "hav[ing]

done an especially good job of laying the ground work."5
When Robinson failed to respond to his first letter,
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Norton sent an urgent telegram imploring the international
to take action and invited Robinson himself to visit the
area himself to see that "these boys want action."6
Robinson belatedly replied on February 2, promising to
assign an organizer "immediately."7

The same day he

responded to Norton's plea for assistance, Robinson ordered
Mine-Mill Board Member and organizer Claud Lovelett,
testifying in another NLRB case in San Francisco, to inspect
"spontaneous organization" in the Ely area.8
The surge of unionism at Kimberly was felt throughout
the district.

At McGill, Local 233 began expanding rapidly.

Claiming only eight active members in January 1943, it had
forty-eight workers enrolled a month later, with thirty-one
more promising to join.

Forty-five of these initiates took

the oath on February 17, coinciding with Lovelett's arrival
in McGill.9

Unlike the situation faced by Haskell in

1941, Lovelett found workers at both the mines and smelter
eager for organization.

His primary task would be to

prevent the companies and the AFL from winning back the
workers' loyalty.
Ely-area employers had historically paid higher rates
than other Western copper districts primarily because of the
dangerous underground mining at Kimberly and because of
Nevada Consolidated's policy of welfare capitalism.

As

noted in Chapter Five, both companies had increased wages
twenty-five cents in January 1942.

Another fifty-cent pay
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raise followed later that year, keeping wages ahead of other
Western copper districts.10
This system began to unravel in January 1943 when
Montana miners were awarded a wage boost that put their
scale ahead of the Ely district.11

On March 6, both

companies responded by announcing that they had filed
requests with the War Labor Board (WLB), the government
agency overseeing wartime wage adjustments, to equalize
wages with Montana.12

It appeared once again that the

companies would stave off another attempt to organize the
area— until Lovelett learned there was no record of the
companies' request.
In late March, Lovelett confirmed that the WLB's
Nonferrous Metals Commission (NMC) had yet to receive an
application from either company for a wage increase.

Armed

with a case of employer duplicity, Lovelett predicted that
this news "will do [Mine-Mill] a lot of good" especially
with workers reluctant to join.

The news "caused quite a

stir," when he told the Kimberly miners, then awaiting their
NLRB election, that no request had been submitted.13
After the companies reestablished the validity of their
requests, Lovelett switched tactics, denigrating the wage
increase as a "two-bit raise" in his handbill campaign.14
Nevada Consolidated workers responded enthusiastically to
this message.

In his report after visiting the district,

Rasmussen wrote: "This is the first time the workers in this
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section of the country have ever been really rioled [sic] up
about anything,...with the two-bit deal...they are fighting
mad."

Rasmussen admitted he had "almost given up hopes of

ever seeing the boys at McGill in their present healthy and
enthusiastic frame of mind."

He also claimed that almost

every smelterworker had paid or promised to join Local
233.15
In mid-March Local 233 officers sent a letter to the
NMC rejecting the wage increase, which they now interpreted
as a tactic to subvert their organizational campaign.

An

appeal to an institution outside the district, this document
marked the demise of the informal equilibrium.

Declaring

that they were "not a party" to the company's request "in
any way[,] shape[,] or form," the smelterworkers voiced the
"strongest possible protest against this so-called wage
increase."

More importantly, they viewed it as "a method

devised to purchase votes for themselves and against our
union in the forthcoming [NLRB] election."16
They further claimed that the company "had ample time
to [increase wages]," but only posted the wage increase once
they observed the campaign's "splendid progress."

Local 233

officers urged the NMC to reject any wage increase "not
negotiated with and agreed to by the company's employees."
Realizing their important position in the production of war
materiel, the officers threatened that if the increase was
approved, it would "deal a serious blow to morale of
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employees" and would decrease copper output in a plant that
was "vitally important to the war effort."17
Having built up some antipathy toward the companies,
Lovelett turned his attention to the AFL, which was
attempting to stem the resurgence of industrial unionism.
On March 4, the AFL expelled Mine-Mill from the White Pine
County Central Labor Council (WPCCLC).

(Despite the

statewide dispute between the AFL and CIO in the 1930s,
Mine-Mill had later rejoined in WPCCLC.)

The AFL barred the

CIO only after the Kimberly miners submitted their NLRB
petition requesting a single industrial union at the
mine.18
Rasmussen noted that the Ely district campaign had
"broken wide open" after the AFL barred Mine-Mill from the
WPCCLC.

He also claimed the AFL was "blasting the hell out

of us with the Las Vegas Scandal," referring to the arrest
of a Mine-Mill organizer during an embattled campaign
against the AFL at the Basic Magnesium plant.19 The AFL
was also accusing Mine-Mill of being a Communist union.
Fearing that red-baiting might derail his
organizational drive, Lovelett countered with an anti-AFL
leaflet campaign and actively courted AFL members to switch
to the CIO.

He convinced many AFL machinists, whose own

negotiations with Nevada Consolidated had stalled, to sign
Mine-Mill membership cards.20 Correctly sensing the mood of
the workers, Lovelett chose the proper moment to attack both
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the AFL and the companies.
Reid Robinson, however, disapproved of Lovelett's
decision to go on the offensive.

Robinson lauded the Ely

campaign's "rapid progress" but objected to negative
campaigning.

After seeing one of Lovelett's handbills,

Robinson warned him that "it will do our program no good to
carry on a campaign of vilification with the AFL."

Perhaps

fearful of the AFL's entrenched presence in the district, he
suggested Lovelett use a "positive approach, outlining [the]
CIO and International Union program."

Robinson also advised

Lovelett to treat the wage increase issue "very carefully."
By referring to the twenty-five-cent wage increase as a
"two-bit" raise (as Lovelett did in his handbills), it
appeared that Mine-Mill was "ridiculing" the offer.
Robinson believed the companies' requests to be genuine and,
even if they were not, worried that the union could not
promise the workers a larger increase from the NMC.21
Lovelett defended his strategy on both counts.

He was

"not carrying on any extensive campaign against" the AFL,
but explaining the "difference between the two organizations
— especially the gains made by Mine-Mill in WLB cases in
1942 and the CIO program."

He argued that the AFL was "not

using any discretion, calling Mine-Mill and the CIO "a bunch
of Reds and God knows what else." [emphasis in original].
He also ignored Robinson's advice about the disputed wage
request.

Not only would he continue mocking the companies'
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"two bit raise," but he would also "protest long and loud"
about their claim to bring wage rates up to regional
standards.

Lovelett saw "no reason why the Company should

all at once try and keep the wage here on an even keel with
other camps."

It would take a larger raise than twenty-five

cents to maintain Ely's higher rate.

For example, common

laborers were only making, what Lovelett facetiously termed,
"the large sum" of $5.90 per day.22 Whether Lovelett's
arguments were decisive in winning converts to the union is
unclear; what is certain was the Kimberly miners' mass
support for Mine-Mill in their NLRB election.
Given the union's lack of success in the Ely district,
Mine-Mill's Kimberly election victory was a watershed event,
establishing an industrial union in the district and
demonstrating the AFL's limits.

At the March 16 hearings

the NLRB allowed the AFL to contend for twenty-two craft
workers at the mine, but the AFL quickly relinquished this
claim.23

Lovelett was "positive" that the AFL, facing

certain defeat, withdrew from the Kimberly election to avoid
setting a precedent for McGill and Ruth and thus "having to
admit [a] second defeat" if it was rejected by the Nevada
Consolidated workers in their election.
In the final balloting, held on May 12, to select MineMill or no union, the Kimberly miners overwhelmingly favored
the CIO by a 440 to 76 margin.24

The Kimberly victory

proved the decisive turning point.

Lovelett remarked that
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it "strengthened [Mine-Mill's] position in this [a]rea to a
great extent," and provided momentum for organizing Nevada
Consolidated.25
The AFL, not company opposition, became Lovelett's most
pressing problem.

At the McGill-Ruth NLRB hearings held

shortly after the Kimberly election, Mine-Mill successfully
argued that the workers at the smelter and the mines should
be combined into one industrial unit for the purpose of
collective bargaining.

This seemingly insignificant victory

represented a dramatic departure from the status quo.

Ruth

and McGill were traditional rivals in local sporting events,
and there was little evidence of cooperation between workers
in two communities.

By melding the two locals into one

unit, Lovelett undermined one of Nevada Consolidated's
strategies for blunting worker consciousness.26
Mine-Mill tried to block the AFL's request for a "globe
election."

Under this procedure, the NLRB allowed skilled

workers to determine if they wished to remain in smaller
craft units or the plantwide industrial unit.27

Mine-

Mill 's attorney, Abraham Isserman, argued against separate
elections for the craft workers, terming them "globaloney
elections" in a legal brief submitted to the NLRB.28
Citing the unique job structure in the copper industry,
Isserman made a strong case for industrial unionism.

If

craft unions remained, workers who routinely were trained at
several tasks would be required to join a different union
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every time they moved to a different job classification.

He

also showed that the "craft tradition" no longer existed at
Nevada Consolidated.

Instead of hiring skilled journeymen,

the company employed unskilled workers who then learned
their craft at the plant.

Isserman concluded by listing

similar cases where the NLRB ruled in favor of one
industrial unit.29
Although Mine-Mill claimed membership of sixty-three
percent of Nevada Consolidated's 1130 employees, the AFL
wanted to ensure it represented the craft workers in the
smaller units where it still held a majority— the
bricklayers, painters, plumbers, iron workers, carpenters,
boilermakers, and electricians.

The AFL countered

Isserman's arguments by correctly noting that Butte, Montana
Mine-Mill industrial units had long coexisted with craft
units.30
Lovelett privately accused the NLRB of favoring the
AFL.

He charged that Trial Examiner Louis Penfield "was by

no means neutral," but, in fact, sided with the AFL.
Lovelett had "a dirty hunch" that Penfield "was not C.I.O."
In "many instances" Penfield "reminded Mr. Olds [Fred Olds,
the AFL's representative] of things that he would have
forgotten otherwise."31

Ultimately, the Board agreed with

the AFL, separating all the workers into twelve
classifications to decide if they wanted to be represented
by the CIO, the AFL, or no union at all.32
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In the midst of the campaign, Lovelett found himself
embroiled in a feud with Robinson.

The dispute surfaced

after an April 20 letter from Robinson reminding Lovelett to
keep his travel expenses within the limitations ($35.00 a
month) set by the union's governing board.33

Lovelett

fired back a letter accusing Robinson of "trying to throw
every obstacle in my way," claiming that "this campaign has
done more to pay its own way here than any I have seen put
on in a good long time."34

Two weeks later, Robinson

demanded an explanation for Lovelett's "caustic attitude"
and challenged the organizer to list "specific instances"
when Robinson impeded his work.35

Lovelett, who had

"intend[ed] to let the matter drop," recounted an incident
in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho in 1941 when he was denied a proper
organizing budget that another organizer was later
granted.36

After this exchange, neither man mentioned the

dispute for the rest of the campaign.
Lovelett continued to attack the AFL.

To do this, he

solicited testimonials from other CIO unions that had
rejected the AFL.

During a meeting immediately after the

NLRB hearings, Lovelett read aloud from a letter sent by
Karl Jensen, secretary for the San Joaquin County
(California) Industrial Union Council, consisting of former
AFL unions that had bolted to the CIO.

Urging the Ruth-

McGill workers to vote for Mine-Mill and the CIO, Jensen
criticized the AFL for "its continuous system of internal
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disputes, Strikes, Lockouts, and high dues, assessments and
High Initation [sic] fees....without many of the priveleges
[sic] of a democratic organization," adding that these were
"benefits which we now enjoy through CIO affiliation."
Jensen likened the AFL's leadership to fascist tyrants: "We
have three world dictators that we are now putting every
effort of manpower and money to the front to whip,...let us
keep our doorstep clean here at home....VOTE CIO."37
Lovelett admitted that "these kind of letters [do] a lot of
good in a campaign of this kind."38
On July 1, Lovelett confided that the campaign was
"continuing to make progress" but there were "great odds"
since the AFL had an advantage of being able to place a
great number of organizers in the area.

Lovelett colorfully

noted that although the AFL had "the town full of their pie
carders," he remained confident Mine-Mill could compete for,
if not win, every craft unit.

He had been told by a "good

many" of the craftsmen that they did not see a craft unit as
"any benefit to them when they knew the large majority of
the employees would choose the CIO as their bargaining
agency."

Additionally, the AFL conceded the groups that

typically supported the CIO— the common laborers or the
operating engineers— which included the vast majority of the
plant.39
Another method Lovelett used to draw worker loyalty
away from the company was to cultivate a political
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consciousness among the workers.

Lovelett encouraged Mine-

Mill members to confront their political representatives
about national labor issues.

His primary target was the

AFL-backed Senator Pat McCarren, a professed "friend of
labor," who Mine-Mill had targeted as an enemy of the CIO
hiding behind a facade of solidarity with organized labor.
During the Senate debates considering the antilabor SmithConnally bill, Lovelett noted that "all local unions," aware
of McCarren's habit of avoiding casting a vote on labor
bills, were "putting heat on [McCarren] to declare himself
[against the bill] and get off the fence."40
Robinson approved of this type of activity, encouraging
Lovelett to pressure politicians "to sit down with [the
members] in Ely and discuss various legislative matters."41
In August and October 1943, McCarren spoke at the Ely and
Pioche, where Mine-Mill members directly asked McCarren to
explain his poor record on labor legislation.42
far cry from the Senator's past evasiveness.
speech at Ely, for example,

This was a

During a 1938

McCarren refused to comment on

"the conditions or differences of view which may exist
within the great body of labor" during the Kimberly miners
ill-fated attempt at NLRB certification.43
At McGill, Lovelett successfully utilized the
grassroots techniques that Haskell found ineffective.

Where

Haskell worked alone, Lovelett established a rank-and-file
organizing committee that functioned with "some results,"
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canvassing and recruiting non-members.44

He also found

innovative ways to maintain the members' interest in the
campaign.

Because of a nearly four-month "lull" caused by

delay between the hearings and the election, Lovelett
thought he could get better attendance at the meetings if he
showed the members "some of the war pictures...ready for
release" and requested a motion picture projector from
Robinson.45
As the elections neared, the union began a coordinated
and concentrated effort to ensure victory.

In mid-August

Robinson, wanting "to leave no stone unturned to win this
very important election," offered Lovelett "some additional
assistance in the form of a budget for hand bills, radio
time, [and] house-to-house contacts...."46

Since there was

no local radio facility in the district, Lovelett continued
to use leaflets to publicize the campaign.

The

organizational committees continued house-to-house
campaigning, and Lovelett, noting that "some additional help
would be of great assistance," hired two full-time workers
as assistants.
Lovelett's choices for these assistants reveal the
political acumen behind his decisions in the days leading up
to the NLRB election.

Because the Mexican workers at Ruth

were disappointed when their candidate was defeated for
Local 124's presidency, Lovelett employed a Mexican worker
from Ruth in hopes of regaining their support.

At McGill,
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Lovelett was "very hesitant" to hire part-time workers,
because it had a "bad effect" on volunteers who received no
pay for their efforts.

E. S. Hakenson, the long-time Local

233 officer, took a leave of absence to work full time.
Despite his efforts, Lovelett still failed to convince a
majority of the skilled workers to switch their allegiance
to Mine-Mill.

Just prior to the election, Lovelett

correctly predicted that while the union would probably lose
some of the craft units, it would be the choice of the vast
majority of Nevada Consolidated's workforce.47
In the NLRB election, Mine-Mill received wide support
among the industrial workers, but five craft groups chose to
remain with the AFL.

On September 2 and 3 the workers of

McGill and Ruth voted to determine their collective
bargaining representative.

Although Mine-Mill did not sweep

the election, it was nevertheless a victory for the new
regime of industrial relations as nearly all the production
and maintenance workers in the mines and the smelter gained
union recognition.

Indicative of the campaigning done by

both Mine-Mill and the AFL, 798 of the 925 eligible voters
participated in the balloting.48

Had the election been a

decided by a simple majority vote, Mine-Mill would have won
easily, garnering fifty-eight percent of the eligible voters
and seventy-one percent of the ballots counted.

In the

total balloting, the AFL locals fared poorly with just 215
votes or twenty-three percent of the eligible voters and
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only twenty-eight percent of the valid ballots.49
In the Ely area, the elections were considered a
sweeping CIO success.

The Ely Daily Times' headline blared:

"C.I.O. Wins Election As Bargaining Agency With Nevada
Consolidated, Nevada Mines," although the accompanying story
noted that five craft units had voted for the AFL.50
Coupled with the union's recent victories at Kennecott's
Utah and New Mexico properties, the Ely victory was a key
step to realizing company-wide bargaining.

To be sure, the

election signified a new capitalist era, as the Ely
district's labor relations quickly conformed to the postwar
model of institutionalized collective bargaining punctuated
with intermittent, and sometimes bitter, strikes.
The Mine-Mill organizers in the Ely district from 1941
to 1943 played an integral role in the formation of this new
regime.

Although they encountered frustration from many

internal and external sources, they helped the area's
workers achieve union recognition, an almost impossible task
before the dislocation caused by World War II.

To some

extent, external conditions set the limits for the "organic
intellectual."

As Haskell discovered, welfare capitalism

was not easily cast aside.

Even though he failed to win the

workers' loyalty, he continually exposed the shortcomings of
Nevada Consolidated's policy, albeit to deaf ears.
Lovelett, on the other hand, found both old and new workers
receptive to his message.

Through a sustained critique of

132
the companies and the AFL, coupled with skillful
campaigning, he helped establish Mine-Mill as an entrenched
presence in the Ely district.
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NOTES
1. For an overview of the national discussion of the labor
shortage in nonferrous metals see "Recent Productivity
Changes in Copper Mining," Monthly Labor Review. (August
1943), 258-264. The local press extensively covered this
issue. See Elv Daily Times. July 17, 1942; July 21, 1942;
Workers volunteered to leave the state. Answering a
government appeal, 40 Nevada miners volunteered at the Reno
sheriff's department for work in Hawaii. This "record
volunteer total" came despite the McCarren-Murdock
subcommittee's finding that there was a labor shortage in
western mining.
Ibid.. July 21, 1942; August 14, 1942;
August 21, 1942. The shortage resurfaced a year later when
the Army twice furloughed ex-miners to return to their
peacetime profession. See "Copper Records," Business Wee k .
(February 13, 1943), 52-58; "Double Draft," ibid. (April 8,
1943), 98; "Still a Big Issue," ibid. (July 24, 1943), 9496; Elv Daily Times. June 16, 1943; June 23, 1943. The labor
shortage at the state level is mentioned in ibid.. August
10, 1942. The labor shortage occurred despite the addition
of more miners. Matt Murphy, state mine inspector, said
that Nevada mines were employing "at least" 2,500 more
miners than they were two years before.
Ibid. October 12,
1943; November 2, 1943; April 4, 1944; May 16, 1944. The
increase in population is noted in ibid. November 3, 1943.
A housing shortage in Kimberly is mentioned in ibid.. July
2, 1943.
2. Ibid.. September 9, 1943. White Pine County District
Attorney John Bonner claimed absenteeism was "serious from a
labor standpoint." He noted that absenteeism caused a "41
percent turnover in employees," citing an eleven percent
labor shortage at Kimberly and a twelve percent shortage at
the nearby Minerva district. Bonner blamed excessive
alcohol abuse for the problem. He targeted the area's
saloons, which stayed open twenty-four hours, and called for
a voluntary closure order which was discussed by local
leaders but not enacted.
3. Keith Norton to Reid Robinson, January 15, 1943, IUMMSW,
Box 141, Folder 642, "Ely." An outsider to the district,
Norton claimed to have been blackballed for organizing Local
466 in Mountain City, Nevada four years previously. He
worked as a miner at Kimberly until March 1941 when he was
injured and became a watchman. Norton also had a pecuniary
motive. He heard that another Mine-Mill organizer in the
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area collected a fee for every new initiate and therefore
expected a bonus for his efforts. Norton claimed that
"Cole," a Mine-Mill organizer, had received a fee for each
new recruit, which Robinson denied. In 1941 Mine Mill
organizer George Haskell had claimed there was a standing
offer of fifty cents for each new initiate. Norton may have
heard about this offer. The number of workers at Kimberly
is taken from 48 NLRB. No. 158. 1276n.
4. Ibid.. p. 1274-1279. The Kimberly workers had notified
Consolidated Coppermines that it "represented a majority of
the employees in an appropriate bargeiining unit. Local 642
submitted 591 application-for-membership cards, 481 that
were signed between January and March 1943.
Consolidated
Coppermines employed "approximately 855 workers in the
unit...."
5. Reid Robinson to Claud Lovelett, March 29, 1943, IUMMSW,
Folder 25, "Claud Lovelett."
6. Keith Norton to Reid Robinson, January 28, 1943, IUMMSW,
Box 141, Folder 642, "Ely."
7. Reid Robinson to Keith Norton, February 2, 1943, IUMMSW,
Box 141, Folder 642, "Ely."
8. Reid Robinson to Claud Lovelett, February 2, 1943,
IUMMSW, Box 40, Folder 25, "Claud Lovelett." Allan D. McNeil
to Claud Lovelett, February 6, 1943, IUMMSW, Box 40, Folder
25, "Claud Lovelett." Detained in San Francisco, Lovelett
apparently did not leave for McGill until February 16 or 17,
after he completed his testimony. Claud Lovelett to Reid
Robinson, February 14, 1943, IUMMSW, Box 40, Folder 25,
"Claud Lovelett."
9. Local 233 Dues Book. 1942-45. IUMMSW, Box 851, Folder 13.
"Steptoe Mill and Smeltermen's Union, #233, McGill, Nevada."
10. Elv Daily Times. June 17, 1942.
11. Ibid.. January 18, 1943.
12. Ibid.. March 6, 1943; Elv Record March 12, 1943.
13. Claud Lovelett to Reid Robinson, March 28, 1943, IUMMSW,
Box 40, Folder 25, "Claud Lovelett."
14. "Do You Want the Facts," Handbill dated March 22, 1943,
IUMMSW, Box 301, Folder 30, "Ralph Rasmussen."
15. Ralph Rasmussen to Reid Robinson, March 19, 1943,
IUMMSW, Box 301, Folder 30, "Ralph Rasmussen."
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16. Ralph Rasmussen to Reid Robinson, March 19, 1943,
IUMMSW, Box 301, Folder 30, "Ralph Rasmussen."
17. Ibid.
18. "Memorandum on Behalf of Petitioner," submitted by
Abraham J. Isserman, Attorney for Petitioning Union [MineMill], National Labor Relations Board File R-5381.
"Kennecott Copper Corp.. Ruth and McGill. Nev.." Record
Group 025: National Labor Relations Board, Unfair Labor
Practic. Represent. File, National Archives, Washington,
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Box 301, Folder 30, "Ralph Rasmussen."
20. Ibid.
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23. 48 NLRB. No. 158.
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26. 51 NLRB. No. 180.
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136
Wagner Act was declared constitutional, and November 1940
when Harry Millis was appointed NLRB chairman. See Chapter
1 for early board policy upholding industrial unionism; see
Chapter 12 for changes under Millis. Still the best work on
the wartime NLRB is Fred Witney's Wartime Experiences of the
National Labor Relations Board. 1941-1945 (Urbana, 1949) .
Witney claims that the NLRB was "deeply concerned with the
preservation of majority rule" during the war, but was
opposed by Congress, who limited the Board's ability to
invalidate separate craft contracts. Ibid. 162. The term
"globe doctrine" derives from the NLRB's 1937 decision in
the Globe Machine and Stamping Co. case, (3 NLRB 2941. This
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Dictionary of Industrial Relations (revised edition,
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35. Reid Robinson to Claud Lovelett, May 12, 1943, IUMMSW,
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1943, IUMMSW, Box 40, Folder 25, "Claud Lovelett."
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40, Folder 25, "Claud Lovelett."
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40.
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41. Reid Robinson to Claud Lovelett, August 17, 1943,
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43. Elv Record. June 3, 1938.
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Elv Daily Times. September 3, 1943.
49. Of the twelve separate units that voted, Mine Mill
prevailed among the watchmen, bricklayers, steelworkers,
truck drivers and warehousemen, cooks and waitresses,
engineers, and production and maintenance employees. The
painters, carpenters, boilermakers, electricians, and
plumbers retained their AFL craft affiliation. 52 N.L.R.B.
No. 232. 1397-1404. Of the groups that voted for Mine Mill,
the union received 84 percent of the vote. Similarly, the
AFL received 72 percent of the craft vote.
50.

Elv Daily Times. September 4, 1943.

EPILOGUE

Mine-Mill's victory in the 1943 NLRB election signified
the final rejection of the informal equilibrium by the Elydistrict's workers.

From that point on, conflict between

labor and capital would be conducted through the post-World
War II model of collective bargaining.
Nevada Consolidated's welfare capitalism could not
survive in this new environment.

The company began

privatizing the company towns in the 1950s, selling its
homes to the residents.

Speaking about this decision, J. C.

Kinnear's son and successor, John Jr., claimed that the
company had "acted very wisely in removing one of the last
vestiges of outmoded paternalism."

This move stemmed from

the changing attitude of the "average employee" who had
acquired a "more independent attitude," and "preferr[ed] to
deal on a basis of partnership with his employer."

Kinnear

correctly noted that the company's policies had become
anachronistic amid the advancing depersonalization of labor
relations after World War II.1
However, Kinnear wrongly assumed that postwar workers
desired to deal with employers on an individual basis.
Instead, workers relied on the institutional structure of
138
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the labor union to confront their employers.

Although

capitalist hegemony remained, the new process through which
capital and labor confronted one another had rendered
obsolete the companies' prewar methods for blunting class
consciousness.

Even as their separate interests were

formally mediated through the increasingly bureaucratic
mechanism of collective bargaining, conflict between labor
and capital continued.
Through their Mine-Mill locals, copperworkers openly
challenged their employers.

In some ways, worker militancy

reflected that of the early twentieth century.

The Ely-

district joined other Mine-Mill locals in waging a series of
strikes against the nation's copper companies throughout the
1950s and early 1960s.

At the McGill smelter, workers

staged several wildcat strikes protesting the company's
time-and-motion studies and speedup policy, both of which
violated their existing contract.

At other times the

copperworkers used brief walkouts to mediate their
grievances.

When asked why the union had changed,

one long-time Mine-Mill officer replied in words that
indicated paternalism was long gone; "Any company or
corporation is out to make as big a profit as they can for
their stockholders....How they do it, they don't care, just
as long as they do it."2
Unlike some Nevada locals, the Ely-district Mine-Mill
locals remained affiliated with the international union
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throughout the Cold War period.

After World War II, Mine-

Mill confronted the combined forces of government
repression, employer opposition, and interunion raiding.
Reid Robinson was ousted in 1947 amid charges he had
solicited a $5,000 loan from a brass company executive.
Mine-Mill, long branded a "red" union, then came under fire
from the government and the increasingly conservative labor
movement:

first, from the refusal of its officers to sign

Taft-Hartley noncommunist affidavits, and second, from the
CIO's charges of "Communist influence."

Expelled from the

CIO and hounded by government authorities throughout the
1950s, Mine-Mill waged a valiant but doomed struggle against
the forces of capitalist reaction, ultimately merging with
the United Steelworkers in 1967.

That merger signalled the

end of radical unionism in the nonferrous metals industry
born seventy-five years earlier.3
Today, the massive smelterworks at McGill sits
abandoned.

A few weeds have grown around its aging walls

which are surrounded by a chain-link fence warning potential
trespassers that they are approaching private property.
Copper production at the site ceased in the early 1980s, and
some of the district's residents still blame the union for
Kennecott's departure.

The neat company houses are still

occupied, but the sleepy town displays little of its former
vibrancy as a thriving smeltertown.

The massive slag pit

spills into the valley to the west like a frozen black
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river, the remnant of eighty years of environmental
despoliation.
To the south, the great open-pit, which continued
expanding until the 1960s, is periodically worked by goldmining companies.

Its deep holes are filled with greenish-

yellow water, colored and poisoned by the chemicals used to
leach the precious metal from the rock.

The mining town of

Ruth, moved several times to make room for the enlarging
pit, contains several blocks of houses in neat rows.

The

buildings at Kimberly have been bulldozed and its
underground mines have been caved in to deter intruders.
This site now serves only the interest of archaeologists,
who scour for artifacts that may give some glimpse into the
lost lives of early twentieth-century copper miners.
Although the county seat of Ely has survived, the
barren mines attest to the area's decline as the state's
leading mineral producer.

The rise and fall of the Ely

district mirrors the common history of many western mining
towns.

Labor and capital struggled early on to construct a

mutually-agreeable system of industrial relations.

At Ely,

this was first resolved with the informal equilibriums of
the 1920s.

However, resulting contradictions and changing

external conditions led to the destruction of this system.
In its place, a formal structure emerged that lasted until
the district's ore finally petered out in the 1980s.

Ely

copperworkers and Mine-Mill organizers played a key role in
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bringing about the new order.

Although the Cold War "social

accord" soon solidified in capital's favor, this was not yet
determined in 1943, when unionism became entrenched in the
area.

To be sure, once Mine-Mill was established in the

district, nobody would have seen "such contented workers."
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NOTES
1. Jack Fleming, "Copper Town King," Nevada Historical
Society Quarterly 25 (Spring 1982), 39.
2. Elv Record. February 11, 1956, ibid.. February 18, 1956;
ibid.. April 6, 1957; ibid.. November 2, 1957; Oral
Interview with Jay Carson by David M. Anderson, July 9,
1993.
3. For a brief history of Mine-Mill after World War II see
Solski and Smaller, Mine-Mill (Ottawa, 1985), 16-18.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. MANUSCRIPT COLLECTIONS
Archives of the International Union of Mine, Mill and
Smelter Workers, Western History Collection, University of
Colorado.
Historical Collections and Labor Archives, Pattee Library,
Pennsylvania State University.
National Labor Relations Board: RG 025, National Archives.,
Suitland, Maryland.
B. UNION RECORDS
Official Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the
International Union of Mine. Mill and Smelter Workers.
1933-1946.
C. NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS
Business Week
CIO News (Mine-Mill Edition)
Elv Daily Times
Elv Daily Record
Mine-Mill Union
Nevada State Labor News
The Pioche Record

144

145
D. ORAL INTERVIEWS
All narrators signed legal release forms permitting the
use of interview material.
Carson, Jay. Ely, Nevada, Interview by David M. Anderson,
July 9, 1993.
Knighton, Wendell. McGill, Nevada, Interview by David M.
Anderson, July 10, 1993.
Skandros, John. Las Vegas, Nevada, Interview by David M.
Anderson, February 6, 1994.
E. PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
Decisions of the National Labor Relations Board. Washington,
D.C.
Fifteenth Census of the United States. 1930. Population.
Vol. 1: Number and Distribution of Inhabitants.
Department of Commerce. Washington, D.C. 1931.
Hearings before the Committee on Education and Labor. United
States Senate. 76th Congress, 1st Session, May 22-24.
Washington, D. C. 1939.
State of Nevada: Biennial Reports of the Commissioner of
Labor, 1915/1916-1940/1942. Appendix to Journals of
the Senate and Assembly. Carson City.

F. BOOKS
Adamson, Walter L. Hegemony and Revolution: A Study of
Antonio Gramsci/s Political and Cultural Theory.
Berkeley, 1980.
Allen, James B. The Company Town in the American West.
Norman OK, 1966.
Bernstein, Irving. Turbulent Years: A History of the
American Worker. 1933-1941. Boston, 1970.
Brandes, Stuart. American Welfare Capitalism. 1880-1940.
Chicago, 1970.

146
Brown, Ronald C. Hard-Rock Miners: The Intermountain West.
1860-1920. College Station TX, 1979.
Cochran, Bert. Labor and Communism: The Conflict that
Shaped American Unions. Princeton, 1977.
Cohen, Lizabeth. Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in
Chicago. 1919-1939. Cambridge MA, 1990.
Cronon, E. David.

Labor and the New Deal.

Chicago, 1963.

Derickson, Alan. Workers' Health. Workers' Democracy.
Ithaca NY, 1988.
Dubofsky, Melvyn. We Shall Be All: A History of the
Industrial Workers of the World. Chicago, 1969.
Edsforth, Ronald.
Class Conflict and Cultural Consensus:
The Making of a Mass Consumer Society in Flint.
Michigan. New Brunswick NJ, 1987.
Elliott, Russell. Nevada's Twentieth-Centurv Mining Boom:
Tonopah. Goldfield. Elv. Reno, 1966.
______________ . History of Nevada. 2d ed., Lincoln, 1987.
_______________ . Growing U p in a Company Town: A Family in
the Copper Camp of McGill. Nevada. Reno, 1990.
Emmons, David M. The Butte Irish: Class and Ethnicity in an
American Mining Town. 1875-1925. Urbana, 1989.
Fink, Gary M . , ed. Biographical Dictionary of American
Labor. 2d ed., Westport CT, 1984.
Garcia, Mario. Mexican Americans: Leadership. Ideology and
Identity. 1930-1960. New Haven, 1989.
Gramsci, Antonio. Quinton Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith,
eds., Selections From the Prison Notebooks of Antonio
Gramsci. London, 1971.
________________ . An Antonio Gramsci Reader: Selected
Writings. 1917-1935. New York, 1988.
Genovese, Eugene D. Roll. Jordan. Roll: The World the
Slaves Made. New York, 1974.
Green, James R. World of the Worker: Labor in TwentiethCenturv America. New York, 1980.

147
Gross, James A. The Reshaping of the National Labor
Relations Board: National Labor Policy in Transition.
1937-1947. Albany, 1981.
Hariss, Mark Jonathan, Franklin D. Mitchell and Steven J.
Schechter, The Homefront: America during World War I I .
New York, 1984.
Hildebrand, George and Garth L. Mangum. Capital and Labor
in American Copper. 1845-1990. Cambridge MA, 1990.
Jensen, Vernon H. Heritage of Conflict: Labor Relations in
the Nonferrous Metals Industry u p to 1930. Ithaca NY,
1950.
________________ . Nonferrous Metals Industry Unionism.
1932-1954. Ithaca NY, 1954.
Joralemon, Ira B.
York, 1934.

Romantic Copper: Its Lure and Lore.

New

Kinnear, Jack. Fifty Years in Mining. Kennecott Copper
Corporation private publication, 1967.
Klehr, Harvey. The Hevdav of American Communism: The
Depression Decade. New York, 1984.
Laurie, Bruce. Artisans into Workers: Labor in NineteenthCentury America. New York, 1989.
Levenstein, Harvey A. Communism. Anti-Communism, and the
CIO. Westport CT, 1981.
Limerick, Patricia Nelson. The Legacy of Conouest: The
Unbroken Past of the American West. New York, 1987.
Lichtenstein, Nelson. Labor's War at Home: The CIO in World
War II. New York, 1982.
Lingenfelter, Richard E. The Hardrock Miners: A History of
the Mining Labor Movement in the American West. 18631893. Berkeley, 1974.
Malone, Michael P. and Richard W. Etulain. The American
West: A Twentieth Century History. Lincoln, 1989.
Nash, Gerald D. World War II and the West: Reshaping the
Economy. Lincoln, 1990.
Navin, Thomas R.
1970.

Copper Mining and Management.

Tucson,

148
O'Connor, Harvey. The Guaaenheims: The Making of an
American Dvnastv. New York, 1937.
Roberts, Harold S. Dictionary of Industrial Relations.
Washington, D.C., 1971.
Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr. The Age of Roosevelt: The Coming
of the New Deal. Boston, 1958.
Simon, Roger. Gramsci's Political Thought: An Introduction
London, 1982.
Solski, Mike and John Smaller. Mine Mill: The History of
the International Union of Mine. Mill and Smelter
Workers in Canada— Since 1895. Ottawa, 1985.
White, Richard.
"It's Your Misfortune and None of Mv Own":
A New History of the American West. Norman OK, 1991.
Witney, Fred. Wartime Experiences of the National Labor
Relations Board. 1941-1945. Urbana, 1949.
Wyman, Mark. Hard Rock Epic: Western Miners and the
Industrial Revolution. 1860-1910. Berkeley, 1979.
Zieger, Robert H. American Workers. American Unions. 19201985. Baltimore, 1986.
G. ARTICLES
Abraham, David.
"Constituting Hegemony: The Bourgeois
Crisis of Weimar Germany," Journal of Modern History.
51 (September, 1979), 417-433.
Beesley, David.
"Communists and Vigilantes in the Northern
Mines," California History 64 (1985), 142-151.
Brody, David. "The Rise and Decline of Welfare Capitalism,"
John Braeman, Robert H. Bremner, and David Brody.
Change and Continuity in Twentieth-Centurv America: The
1920s. Columbus OH, 1968, 147-178.
Cargill, Jack. "Empire and Opposition: The 'Salt of the
Earth' Strike," Robert Kern, ed., Labor in New Mexico:
Unions. Strikes, and Social History since 1881.
Albuquerque, 1983, 183-267.
Couch, Bertrand and Jay A. Carpenter. "Nevada's Metal and
Mineral Production, 1859-1940," University of Nevada
Bulletin. 37 (November 1, 1943).

149
Dinwoodie, D. H. "The Rise of the Mine-Mill Union in
Southwestern Copper," James C. Foster, ed. American
Labor in the Southwest: The First One Hundred Years.
Tucson, 1982, 46-56.
Dubofsky, Melvyn. "The Origins of Western Working-Class
Radicalism, 1890-1905," Labor History 7 (Spring 1966),
131-154.
Elliott, Russell. "History of Nevada Mines Division,
Kennecott Copper Corp.," unpublished study covering the
period between 1900 and 1956, Nevada Historical
Society, Reno, n.d..
Fine, Lisa M. "'Our Big Happy Family': Masculinity and
Paternalism at the Reo Motor Car Company of Lansing,
Michigan," Labor History. 34 (Spring/Summer 1993), 274291.
Fleming, Jack.
"Copper Town King," Nevada Historical
Society Quarterly 25 (Spring 1982), 28-45.
Garcia, Mario T. "Border Proletarians: Mexican-American and
the International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter
Workers, 1939-1946," Robert Asher and Charles
Stephenson, eds., Labor Divided: Race and Ethnicity in
United States Labor Struggles. 1836-1960. Albany,
1990, 83-104.
Greene, Bob.
"Western Federation of Miners/Mine Mill, and
Smelter Workers," Mary Jo Buhle, Paul Buhle, and Dan
Georgakas, eds., Encyclopedia of the American Left.
Urbana, 1992, 821-823.
Huntley, Horace.
"The Red Scare and Black Workers in
Alabama: The International Union of Mine, Mill, and
Smelter Workers, 1945-1953," Robert Asher and Charles
Stephenson, eds., Labor Divided. Albany, 1990, 129145.
Iverson, Peter.
"Welfare Capitalism at the Reo Motor Car
Company," Michigan History 69 (November/December 1985),
37-44.
Kimeldorf, Howard. "Bringing the Unions Back In (Or Why We
Need a New Old Labor History," Labor History. 32
(1991), 91-103.

150
Lichtenstein, Nelson. "From Corporatism to Collective
Bargaining: Organized Labor and the Eclipse of Social
Democracy in the Postwar Era," Gary Gerstle and Steve
Fraser, eds., The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order.
1930-1980. Princeton, 1989, 122-152.
Meltzer, Richard.
"'Phelps Dodge Knows Best': Welfare
Capitalism in a New Mexico Camp, Dawson, 1920-1929,
Southwest Economy and Society 6 (1982), 12-34.
Monds, Jean. "Workers' Control and the Historians: A New
Economism, New Left Review. 97 (1976), 81-104.
Patterson, Tim. "Notes on the Historical Application of
Marxist Cultural Theory," Science and Society. 39 (Fall
1975), 257-291.
"Recent Productivity Changes in Copper Mining," Monthly
Labor Review. (August, 1943), 258-264.
Troy, Leo. "Trade Union Membership, 1897-1962," National
Bureau of Economic Research. New York, 1965.
Wallace, Michael, Beth A. Rubin, and Brian T. Smith,
"American Labor Law: Its Impact on Working-Class
Militancy, 1901-1980," Social Science History 12
(Spring 1988), 1-29.
Zahavi, Gerald, "Negotiated Loyalties: Welfare Capitalism
and the Shoeworkers of Endicott Johnson, 1920-1940,"
Journal of American History 70 (1983), 602-620.

